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ABSTRACT
Do firms release news strategically in response to investor inattention? We consider news about
earnings and analyze the response of returns to announcements on Friday and other weekdays. Friday
announcements have less immediate and more delayed stock return response. The delayed response
as a percentage of the total response is 60 percent on Friday and 40 percent on other weekdays. In
addition, abnormal trading volume around announcement day is 10 percent lower for Friday
announcements. These findings suggest that weekends distract investor attention temporarily. They
support explanations of post-earning announcement drift based on underreaction to information
caused by limited attention. We also document that firms release worse announcements on Friday.
Friday announcements are associated with a 45 percent higher probability of a negative earnings
surprise and a 50 basis points lower abnormal return. The firm-based evidence of strategic news
release corroborates the investor-based evidence of inattention on Friday. The results for stock
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Consumers are bombarded with information regarding their personal and professional obliga-
tions. The cognitive capacities to process all of this information are limited. Limited cognitive
capacities can explain, among other ﬁndings, the use of heuristics in cognitive decision-making
(Gabaix et al., 2002) and underreaction to information (Huberman and Tomer, 2001). Despite
the importance of limits to cognitive resources, little evidence exists on the extent to which
the quality of decision-making declines in response to distractions.
We examine a decision where attention to new information plays a crucial role, the response
to earnings surprises. We consider a regular event that is likely to distract investors from job-
related tasks, the weekend. We compare the reaction to earnings surprises for announcements
that occur just before the weekend, on Friday, to the reaction on other weekdays.
If weekends distract investors and lower the quality of decision-making, the immediate
response to Friday earnings surprises should be less pronounced. As investors revisit their
decisions in subsequent periods, the information should eventually be incorporated in stock
prices. As a result, the delayed response, measured by the post-earnings announcement drift,
should be of greater magnitude for Friday announcements.
This paper contributes to the debate regarding the causes of post-earnings announcement
drift and momentum. Behavioral explanations for these anomalies depend on disposition eﬀect
(Grinblatt and Han, 2002; Frazzini, 2004), ﬂuctuations in overconﬁdence (Daniel, Hirshleifer,
and Subrahmanyam, 1998), beliefs about mean reversion (Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998),
or underreaction to information due to cognitive limits (Hong and Stein, 1999). Of these
explanations, only underreaction to information makes the prediction that distractions increase
the drift. Our paper, therefore, constitutes a novel test of the underreaction explanation.
We also consider the ﬁrm reaction to investor distraction. Managers that maximize short-
term value may exploit investor inattention by releasing negative announcements on Friday.
The tendency to release bad news on Friday is allegedly common among ﬁrms and politicians.
However, little evidence exists, because it is diﬃcult to quantify good and bad news. We
exploit the measurability of news quality for earnings announcements and document the extent
of strategic release on Friday, controlling for other factors.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we present a model of the response of stock
prices to signals about earnings. In each period a share of the agents is distracted and does
not observe a signal regarding company performance. Given limits to arbitrage in the form
of risk aversion, the distracted agents aﬀect prices. A larger share of inattentive investors
shrinks the immediate response and magniﬁes the delayed response of prices to the signals.
Distraction, therefore, increases the post-earnings announcement drift. The combined response
to the announcement, however, is not aﬀected by the distracted investors.
We also analyze the managerial decision to announce the signal on a low-distraction or high-
1distraction day. Companies that maximize the long-term share price do not have any incentive
to strategically release information. Companies that maximize short-term share value, instead,
adopt a simple threshold rule and release bad news on high-distraction days.
In the empirical section, we consider earnings announcements from January 1995 until June
2004. Since we analyze the diﬀerence between Friday and non-Friday announcements, the
accuracy of the announcement date is critical. In Section 3 we devise a rule that identiﬁes the
correct announcement date from I/B/E/S and Compustat data with over 95 percent accuracy.
In Section 4, we evaluate the immediate, delayed, and long-term stock response to informa-
tion by comparing the top and bottom quantile of the earnings surprise. The immediate stock
response is 15 percent lower for Friday announcements than for non-Friday announcements.
We ﬁnd a similar attenuation using non-linear regressions for the whole sample. Conversely,
the delayed response is 60 percent larger for Friday announcements. The combined long-term
reaction is similar for Friday and non-Friday announcements.
We combine these ﬁndings in a summary measure. The delayed response as a percentage of
the total response is 60 percent on Friday and 40 percent on other weekdays. The results are
precisely estimated and are similar in the diﬀerent speciﬁcations. The pattern is present for
both positive and negative surprises, although the results are less precise for negative surprises.
These ﬁndings are consistent with weekend distractions. Individuals are more likely to
underreact initially to Friday announcements. Eventually, investors become aware of the in-
formation they neglected and trade accordingly. The stronger delayed response reverses the
initial underreaction induced by the distractions.
If investors are more distracted on Friday, we also expect lower abnormal trading volume
for Friday announcements. In Section 5, we ﬁnd that the abnormal volume is indeed 10 to
20 percent lower for Friday announcements than for non-Friday announcements. The results
remain large and signiﬁcant even after the introduction of controls and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects.
The stock return and volume results suggest that investors exhibit a lower immediate
response to Friday announcements. If ﬁrm managers wish to control the short-term response
to earnings announcements, they should release worse announcements on Friday than on other
weekdays. Indeed, in Section 6 we show that earnings announced on Friday are 25 percent
more likely to be negative, and 45 percent more likely to fail to meet analyst expectations.
Moreover, abnormal stock returns around announcement date are 50 basis points lower for
Friday announcements. The evidence on the strategic release of bad news on Friday builds on
Damodaran (1989). Damodaran documents worse earnings announcements and lower stock
returns for Friday earnings (and dividend) announcements in the period 1981-1985. Compared
to Damodaran (1989), we show that analysts are also disappointed by news released on Friday
and that the results are robust to the introduction of company ﬁxed eﬀects and other controls.
In addition, we provide an explanation for the release of negative news on Friday.
In Section 7 we consider alternative interpretations of the empirical ﬁndings regarding
2earnings announcements. First, the lower response to Friday announcements may be caused by
the leakage of information before the oﬃcial earnings announcements. However, the response of
stock returns to earnings announcements in the 30 days before the announcement does not diﬀer
systematically for Friday and non-Friday announcements. Second, the lower initial response to
Friday announcements could be due to systematic diﬀerences in the characteristics of companies
announcing on Friday. While it is impossible to fully control for company heterogeneity, we
show that the results are robust to the introduction of time, company, and market capitalization
controls. In addition, we argue that heterogeneity is unlikely to simultaneously produce less
immediate response and more delayed response for Friday announcements.
The results in this paper are related to the literature on inattention in ﬁnance (Barber and
Odean, 2002; Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny 1998; Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam,
1998; DellaVigna and Pollet, 2005; Hong and Stein, 1999). From this standpoint, our key
ﬁnding is that a distracting event increases the delayed reaction of stock prices to new infor-
mation. This result supports the theory that momentum eﬀects (Jegadeesh and Titman 1993)
and post-earnings announcement drift (Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok, 1996; Bernard and
Thomas, 1989) are caused by underreaction to new information due to cognitive constraints.
The evidence that ﬁrms schedule worse announcements on Friday expands the literature on
earnings manipulation (Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal, 2004). Firms manipulate accounting
measures to achieve positive earnings or positive surprises (Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser,
1999) and emphasize ‘street’ or GAAP earnings depending on which is more favorable (Dyck
and Zingales, 2003; Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003). In addition, ﬁrms release bad news later in
the day (Patell and Wolfson, 1982) and later in the earnings season (Begley and Fischer, 1998).
Finally, this paper is an additional example of a market response to a bias. This is a
long-standing theme in ﬁnance (Baker, Ruback, and Wurgler, forthcoming; DeLong et al.,
1990; Shleifer, 2000) and it has more recently been applied to ﬁrm pricing (DellaVigna and
Malmendier, 2004; Gabaix and Laibson, 2004) and political decision-making (Glaeser, 2005).
2M o d e l
We present a model of investment where some of the agents are distracted. All investors are
exposed to a signal about next period’s dividend, but only a fraction pay attention to the
signal. All agents pay attention to the realized divided. The fraction of inattentive investors
varies over time, for example depending on the day of the week of announcement. We use the
noise trader framework of DeLong et. al. (1990) and allow managers to respond to investor
inattention as in Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003). Unlike in this latter paper, however, managers
cannot manipulate the signal. Instead, managers select the fraction of distracted investors by
choosing the announcement date.
3Setup. The model is an overlapping generations framework, where the time interval for
each period is best thought of as a quarter of a year. Investors make an investment decision at
time t and then consume all of their wealth at time t + 1 after selling their assets to the next
generation of investors. The timing for the model is as follows.
1. During period t − 1 the risk associated with the dividend Dt is resolved, and Dt is paid
at the end of period t − 1.
2. Before the beginning of period t, the manager of the company decides to announce the
signal st on a day when the share of distracted investors is high or when it is low. This
signal resolves some of the risk regarding the next dividend. The signal st becomes public
before the start of period t, but only the attentive investors observe it.
3. At the beginning of period t, all investors choose the amount of wealth to be invested
in the risky asset and in the riskless asset. Attentive investors use the signal st to make
this portfolio decision, while the distracted investors do not. The equilibrium price Pt is
determined by aggregating demand for the risky asset across all investors.
4. After the equilibrium price is determined for period t but before the start of period t+1,
the risk regarding the dividend (Dt+1)i sr e s o l v e da n dDt+1 is paid to both types of
investors.
In the spirit of a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, we ﬁrst solve for the optimal portfolio
choice given the beliefs of the investors. We then investigate the optimal managerial policy
conditioned on the decisions and beliefs of the investors. We verify that the investors’ and
manager’s beliefs are correct in equilibrium.
Portfolio choice. At the beginning of quarter t, investor i with a wealth Wi
t makes a
portfolio decision between a riskless asset and a risky asset. The riskless asset has a price of 1
and a gross return of 1+R every period. The risky asset has price Pt and pays a risky dividend
Dt+1 before the start of period t + 1. Investor i chooses the optimal investment of λi
t units
in the risky asset in order to maximize end-of-period wealth. Each investor has a quadratic
utility function with risk aversion parameter γ>0. We deﬁne Ei
t[.] as the expectation operator

























Substituting the budget constraint into the maximization problem, we obtain the following
solution for the demand λi









i,t,P+D ≡ Va r i
t (Pt+1 + Dt+1). The demand for the risky asset depends positively on the
investor’s expectations of the future price Pt+1 and the future dividend Dt+1, and negatively
on the current price Pt. Furthermore, the demand depends negatively on the risk aversion
parameter γ and the perceived variance of the risky asset, σ2
i,t,P+D.
In order to complete the model, we need to specify the process for Dt+1, as well as the
rules governing the expectations of the investors. We assume that the dividend Dt+1 incorpo-
rates both a signal (the earnings announcement) and an idiosyncratic realization. Formally,
Dt+1 equals δ + st + εt+1 where st ∼ N(0,σ2
s) is the signal broadcast to the public about the
upcoming dividend before the choice of λi
t. The term εt+1 ∼ N(0,σ2
ε) is the random compo-
nent of dividends that is unknown until the end of period t. We assume that st and εt are
contemporaneously independent and are drawn identically and independently across periods.
As for investor expectations, we assume that there is a continuum of investors on the
interval [0,1] where a fraction 1 − µt of investors observes the signal st (attentive investors)
and a fraction µt of investors does not (distracted investors). The manager chooses the share
of distracted investors µt to be low (µl)o rh i g h( µh), with 0 ≤ µl ≤ µh ≤ 1. This feature
of the model captures the idea that, within a quarter t, companies can release information
on low-attention days–Friday–or high-attention days–other weekdays. We deﬁne E
µ
t [.]a n d
σ2
µ,t,(.) as the conditional expectation and variance operators for investors that do not observe
the signal (i ≤ µ). Similarly, we let E
1−µ
t [.]a n dσ2
1−µ,t,(.) be the conditional expectation and
variance operators for investors that observe the signal (i>µ ). The model nests the standard
case with no distracted agents (µl = µh =0 ) .W ed e ﬁne E[.]a n dEt[.] as the ‘true’ conditional
and unconditional expectation operators, where Et[.]=E
1−µ
t [.]b yc o n s t r u c t i o n .
At the beginning of time t, the attentive investors form their expectation of dividend using
st: E
1−µ
t [Dt+1]=Et[Dt+1]=δ + st. The distracted investors, instead, form an unconditional
expectation of future dividends: E
µ
t [Dt+1]=E[Dt+1]=δ. Expectations about dividends
two periods in the future do not depend on distraction in period t: for any k ≥ 0a n dv,w
∈ {µ,1 − µ}, Ev
t+k[Ew
t+k+1[Dt+k+2]] = δ.




1. After substituting for λi




t [Dt+1 + Pt+1]+( 1− bt)E
1−µ
















, Et = btE
µ
t [.]+( 1− bt)E
1−µ





The price of the asset is a weighted sum of the expectations for distracted and attentive
investors, with weights given by bt and 1 − bt, respectively. The weight bt itself is increasing
in the fraction of distracted agents µt, as shown in the Appendix. The risk premium at is
increasing in the risk aversion parameter γ.













EtEt+1 ...Et+s[Dt+s+1 − at+s]
(1 + R)
s+1 .
T h ep r i c eo ft h ea s s e ti np e r i o dt equals the expected payout in period t +1( ﬁrst term)
plus the expected payout in the later periods (second term). Next, we analyze the expec-
tations of Dt+s+1 and at+s in the second term. Since the information available at time t
is uninformative regarding Dt+s+1, ∀ s>0, we know that Et+1Et+2 ...Et+s[Dt+s+1]=δ.
In principle, the risk premium at+s depends on the managerial policy of information release,
which itself depends on the realized signal. However, since future signals about dividends





t+s−1[at+s]=¯ a where ¯ a = ηa(µh)+( 1− η)a(µl)a n dη = prob(µt+s = µh)1.
Consequently, EtEt+1 ...Et+s[at+s]=¯ a.I tf o l l o w st h a t
Pt =









The price Pt equals the sum of three terms, the future discounted (risk-adjusted) dividend for
all periods after the next, the average (risk-adjusted) dividend for period t+1, and the signal
st for period t+1. In the case of no distraction (µt =0f o ra l lt), bt equals 0 and expression (3)
simpliﬁes to Pt =( δ − ¯ a)/R + st/(1 + R). Hence, the sensitivity of Pt to the signal st equals
1/(1 + R). In the presence of distracted agents (µt > 0), bt is positive and the sensitivity
∂Pt/∂st is less than 1/(1 + R). Inattention makes prices less responsive to signals.
Given the expression for Pt we can solve for σ2
µ,t,P+D and σ2












Va r[(1 − bt)st − at]. The perceived variance is higher for the distracted investors, since they






larger the diﬀerence between σ2
µ,t,P+D and σ2
1−µ,t,P+D. In the Appendix we show that the term
σ2
(1−b)s−a is time-invariant, which implies that σ2
µ,t,P+D and σ2
1−µ,t,P+D are also time-invariant.
Response to signal. We now derive measures of the immediate and of the delayed
response of the stock price to the signal st. These measures are the theoretical counterparts for
the short-term response to an earnings announcement and post-earnings-announcement drift,
respectively. Consider the return to the risky asset for two periods, from t − 1( b e f o r et h e
signal st is realized) to t + 1 (after the dividend Dt+1 is paid). During the ﬁrst period, the
attentive agents learn the signal st, the equivalent of the earnings announcement. After the
signal, trade takes place and the price Pt is determined. Therefore, between t − 1a n dt the
1We are assuming that the perceived variances are time-invariant. This condition is veriﬁed in the Appendix.
6immediate price reaction to the signal st takes place. During the second period, from t to t+1,
the dividend Dt+1 is realized and trade takes place again. A delayed reaction to the signal st
may occur. Therefore, the total excess return from t − 1t ot +1c a nb ed e c o m p o s e di n t oa n
immediate response–from t−1t ot–and a delayed response–from t to t+1. InPropositions
1 through 3 we analyze how these measures depend on the share of inattentive investors.
Deﬁne the dollar excess return from t−1t ot as Zt = Pt+Dt−(1+R)Pt−1. The abnormal
return for the ﬁrst period (t−1t ot) is the diﬀerence between Et [Zt]a n dEt−1 [Zt], that is, the
change in expected returns due to new information. This abnormal return Et [Zt] − Et−1[Zt]
incorporates two sources of new information: the signal st (regarding Dt+1) and the unexpected
dividend Dt −Et−1[Dt]. The second component is unrelated to the signal st (by construction,
Dt is a function of st−1, not of st). Therefore, in order to focus on the response to the signal,
we deﬁne the immediate response Et [IRt] ≡ Zt − Et−1[Zt] − (Dt − Et−1[Dt]), the unexpected
excess return minus the unexpected dividend. Deﬁne σbs = Cov(bt,s t).
Proposition 1.(i) The immediate response Et [IRt] is given by
Et [IRt]=









Et [IRt] is a linear function of the signal st, with slope coeﬃcient (1 − bt)/(1 + R). (ii) The
coeﬃcient (1−bt)/(1 + R) is decreasing in the share of distracted investors µt and is equal to
1/(1 + R) if µt =0 .
The ﬁrst two terms in expression (4) depend on the strategic behavior of the company
manager (addressed below). The ﬁrst term represents the unexpected ﬂuctuation in the risk
premium, while the second term reﬂects the covariance between the fraction of attentive in-
vestors and the signal. If the share of inattentive agents does not vary, making managerial
behavior irrelevant, both terms vanish. The ﬁnal term is the most relevant for the empirical
Section. The abnormal return due to the announcement is a linear function of signal st (con-
ditional on the share of attentive agents at the time of release). The slope of this function,
(1 − bt)/(1 + R), is decreasing in the share of distracted investors µt. Inattentiveness reduces
the immediate response of stock prices to the information contained in the signal.
The excess return for the second period (t to t+1)isZt+1. We measure the change in this
expected return due to the realization of the signal st (the announcement) as Et [DRt+1] ≡
Et [Zt+1]−Et−1[Zt+1]. This measure captures the delayed response of stock prices to the signal
st. Hence, it is the theoretical equivalent of the post-earnings announcement drift.
Proposition 2.(i) The delayed response Et [DRt+1] is given by
Et [DRt+1]=( at − ¯ a) − σbs + btst. (5)
7Et [DRt+1] is a linear function of the signal st, with slope coeﬃcient bt. (ii) The coeﬃcient bt
is increasing in the share of distracted investors µt and is equal to zero if µt =0 .
The ﬁrst two terms in expression (5) closely parallel the corresponding terms in expression
(4). They reﬂect ﬂuctuations in attention and strategic managerial behavior. The last term
captures the delayed response as a function of the signal. In particular, Et [DRt+1]i sal i n e a r
function of the signal st, conditional on the share of distracted agents at the time of release. The
slope of the delayed reaction is increasing in the number of distracted investors and equals zero
if all agents are attentive. Propositions 1 and 2 provide testable implications. A larger fraction
of distracted agents leads to a lower immediate response and a greater delayed response.
We also consider the excess return during the two periods from t − 1t ot +1 ,t h a ti s ,
Zt+1,t−1 ≡ Pt+1 + Dt+1 +( 1+R)Dt − (1 + R)
2 Pt−1. We are interested in the change in this
return due to the announcement of the signal st. As above, we remove the component due to
the unexpected dividend Dt. Therefore, we deﬁne the (discounted) long-term response to the
announcement as Et [LRt+1] ≡ (Et [Zt+1,t−1] − Et−1[Zt+1,t−1])/(1 + R) − (Dt − Et−1[Dt]).
Proposition 3.(i) The long-term response Et [LRt+1] equals the discounted sum of the






Et [LRt+1] is a linear function of the signal st, with slope coeﬃcient 1/(1 + R). (iii) The
coeﬃcient 1/(1 + R) is independent of the share of distracted investors µt.
The long-term response does not depend on the share of inattentive investors. The dis-
tracted investors slow the diﬀusion of information, but do not aﬀect the cumulative response.
Finally, we consider a summary measure of the delay with which the news is incorporated
in stock returns. Let sA and sB be signals of diﬀerent quality where sA >s B.W ed e ﬁne the
delayed response ratio as the ratio of (diﬀerential) delayed response to the (diﬀerential) long-
term response: DRRt =( E[DRt|sA,µ t] − E[DRt|sB,µ t])/(E[LRt|sA,µ t] − E[LRt|sB,µ t]).




and it satisﬁes 0 ≤ DRRt ≤ 1/(1 + R).( i i ) DRRt is increasing in the share of distracted
investors µt and is equal to zero if µt =0 .
On high-distraction days (high µt), a greater fraction of the long-term response is delayed.
In the absence of distraction (µt =0 ) , the delayed response ratio is zero.
8Manager optimization. The manager of the ﬁrm cannot manipulate the mean or variance
of the signal st. However, the manager can announce the signal on a high-distraction (µt = µh)
or a low-distraction day (µt = µl). We consider managers that decide the day of announcement
each period. We allow these agents to maximize long-term value or short-term value.2 We also
consider managers that commit ex ante to a simple announcement strategy.
Long-term managers maximize the expectation at time t of prices at time t +1 ,t h a ti s ,
Et[Pt+1]. Expression (3) for Pt+1 implies Et[Pt+1]=( δ − ¯ a)/R − σbs/(1 + R), an expression
that is independent of the decision to release at µt = µl or at µt = µh. (This expression is
identical for Et[Pt+k], with k ≥ 1.) Since the expected long-term price is independent of the
release decision, the manager is indiﬀerent between µt = µl and µt = µh.
Short-term managers maximize the current price Et [Pt]=Pt. They solve the problem
max
µt∈{µh,µl}









subject to the deﬁnitions for at and bt. The manager faces a trade-oﬀ between two forces,
captured in the last two terms of (7). First, a manager releasing a low signal st prefers to
release when distraction is high (µt = µh and bt high) so that fewer investors become aware
of the signal (and vice versa for a high signal). Second, the decision to release on a high-
distraction day increases the risk premium at since a higher fraction of investors does not
observe the signal. In the Appendix, we show that the trade-oﬀ between these forces leads to
a threshold rule. Managers release on high-distraction days whenever the signal is suﬃciently
negative (st ≤− σ2
sγ). The threshold rule depends on risk aversion γ and the variance of the
signal σs. An increase in either of these two parameters increases the risk premium associated
with release on high-distraction days, and therefore decreases the share of signals released on
such days. The threshold rule implies that the average signal st released on high-distraction
days (µt = µh) is worse than the average signal st released on low-distraction days (µt = µl).
Similarly, the average immediate response IRt is lower on high-distraction days.
Managers that commit to a simple announcement strategy decide ex ante to always release
the signal on a high-distraction day or on a low-distraction day. These managers maximize
future expected price. Since the release strategy is independent of the signal, the expected
price simpliﬁes to Et [Pt+1]=( δ − aj)/R,w h e r ej = h or l.G i v e nt h a taj is increasing in the
fraction of distracted agents µ, committed managers announce information on a low-distraction
day in all periods. Proposition 4 summarizes the predictions regarding managerial behavior.
Proposition 4. (i) Managers that maximize long-term value are indiﬀerent between µl and
µh. (ii) Managers that maximize short-term value choose µt = µh whenever st ≤− σ2
sγ. It fol-
2It is straightforward to show that managers that maximize a combination of long-term and short-term value
behave like short-term value maximizers.
9lows that E [st|µt = µh] <E[st|µt = µl] and E [IRt|µt = µh] <E[IRt|µt = µl]. (iii) Managers
that commit to a simple announcement strategy always choose µt = µl.
Summary. On high-distraction days, stocks returns should display less initial response to
announcements and more delayed response. The distracted investors should have no impact
on the long-term response to announcements. The model also addresses the strategic release
of information by managers. As long as some managers maximize short-term value, the signal
quality should be lower on high-distraction days.
3 Data and summary statistics
Data. Our sources of earnings data are I/B/E/S and Compustat. We use the quarterly
earnings announcements from I/B/E/S for which at least one analyst forms an earning forecast
in the 30 days before the announcement. We restrict the sample to announcements that are
reported in both I/B/E/S and Compustat with a diﬀerence of at most 5 calendar days between
the reported announcement dates. We also require that stock return data be available in CRSP
for these announcements. The resulting sample includes 202,933 quarterly announcements
during the period from January 1984 to June 2004.
We construct a measure of the announcement date using the reported Compustat and
I/B/E/S dates. In order to quantify the accuracy of these dates, we randomly select 2,614
earnings announcements for the period 1984 to 2003 and use Lexis-Nexis to search the an-
nouncement date in the PR newswires. We tak et h en e w s w i r ed a t et ob et h et r u ed a t eo f
announcement. We look for the function of the Compustat and I/B/E/S dates that matches
the newswire date most accurately. We oversample announcements that occur on Friday ac-
cording to I/B/E/S. The results of the search (available upon request) suggest that the optimal
imputation rule for the date diﬀers for three categories of announcements:
1. I/B/E/S and Compustat announcement dates diﬀer. In the case of disagreement, the
earlier date is usually the actual date of the announcement, and the later date is the date
of publication in the Wall Street Journal. We impute the date to be the earlier one.
2. Before January 1, 1989: I/B/E/S and Compustat announcement dates agree. In this
case, most announcements are recorded using the Wall Street Journal date in both data
sets. We assign the announcement date to be the previous trading date.
3. After January 1, 1989: I/B/E/S and Compustat announcement dates agree. During this
time period, the announcement date is usually from a newswire source. We impute the
date to be the I/B/E/S and Compustat date.
After applying these rules, we measure the accuracy of the imputed announcement date
(Appendix Table 1) for Friday and non-Friday announcements over three diﬀerent time periods.
10In the period before 1989, the imputed date is correct for 65.6 percent of the non-Friday
announcements and for 50.0 percent of the Friday announcements. Whenever the date is
incorrect, the error is almost always of only one trading day. For the periods from 1989 to
1994, the pattern is similar, with higher accuracy rates. The accuracy is highest in the period
from 1995 to 2004: the date is correct in 95.6 percent of the cases for Friday announcements
and in 95.8 percent of the cases for non-Friday announcements.
This data suggests three patterns. First, before 1995 a substantial fraction of earnings
announcements is recorded with error of one trading day. Second, the errors in recording are
more common for Friday announcements than for non-Friday announcements, except in the
later period. Third, the accuracy of the earning date has increased substantially, and is almost
perfect after December 1994. For the purposes of this paper, even a one-day error in the report-
ing of the date is important, since it may lead to a misclassiﬁcation of Friday announcements.
In light of this evidence, we limit the analysis to the 127,099 earnings announcements taking
place after 1994. In this period, the imputed earnings announcement date is almost always
correct both for Friday and for non-Friday announcements.
As a measure of investor expectation, we use the consensus analyst forecast from I/B/E/S.
The consensus forecast is deﬁned as the median forecast among all the analysts that make a
forecast in the last 30 calendar days before the earning announcement. If an analyst has made
multiple forecasts in this time horizon, we use only the most recent one.3
We deﬁne the earnings surprise as the diﬀerence between the earnings announcement and
the consensus earnings forecast, normalized by the price of a share (Kothari, 2001). Let et,k
be the earnings per share announced in quarter t for company k and ˆ et,k be the corresponding
consensus analyst forecast4. Further, indicate by Pt,k the price of the shares of company k ﬁve
trading days before the announcement in quarter t. The earnings surprise st,k is
st,k =
et,k − ˆ et,k
Pt,k
. (8)
The price of a share Pt,k is a renormalization factor. The earning surprise st,k can be interpreted
as the unexpected proﬁts as a share of total market value of the company. For example, a
value of s1
t,k = .01 implies that the company earned an additional 1 percent of its market
capitalization above the consensus estimate for proﬁts.
We match the announcement dates with information on stock returns from CRSP. We
also extract from CRSP measures of market capitalization and trading volume. We construct
3The results are similar if we use the average forecast as a measure of consensus forecast or if we use analyst
forecasts over a shorter (15 days) horizon.
4The measure of earnings per share in I/B/E/S reﬂects capital structure changes. In order to make the units
of the earning announcements and forecasts comparable with the units of the price data Pt,k, we apply the
adjustment provided by I/B/E/S. Since the adjustment factor is stored as a truncated number, the resulting
variables et,k and ˆ et,k have fractional cents. We round the earning per share measure et,k to the nearest cent
and the earnings forecast ˆ et,k to the nearest half cent.
11cumulative abnormal returns for diﬀerent windows of event time around the announcement
date. Deﬁne Rτ,k the stock return of company k on day τ and Rτ,m the market stock return
on day τ.W eo b t a i nˆ β for company k in quarter t from the regression Ru,k = αt,k + βt,kRu,m
for days u from τ − 300 to τ − 46, where τ is the date of the announcement in quarter t.T h e
buy-and-hold abnormal return R
(h,H)
t,k over time period (τ + h,τ + H)f o rs t o c kk in quarter t
is then computed as
h
Πτ+H





j=τ+h (1 + Rj,m) − 1
i
.5
We drop observations with a missing earnings surprise (5,718 observations), or in which
the earnings announcement et,k or the earnings forecast ˆ et,k are larger in absolute value than
the price of a share Pt,k (173 observations). We also eliminate penny stocks (748 observations)
as well as announcements on Saturday, Sunday, or holidays (228 observations). Finally, we





t,k (50 observations). The ﬁnal sample includes 121,381 observations.
Summary statistics. Earnings announcements in the ﬁnal sample are distributed un-
evenly across weekdays (Table 1A). More than 80 percent of announcements occur on Tuesday,
Wednesday, or Thursday, 14.0 percent occur on Monday and only 5.7 percent are on Friday.
The model suggests a potential explanation for the small share of Friday announcements: ﬁrms
that commit to an announcement schedule never announce on a low-attention day (Friday).
In Table 1B we present summary statistics for the whole sample (Column 1), for the 6,987
Friday announcements (Column 2), and for the 114,394 non-Friday announcements (Column
3). The average earning surprise st,k is more negative for Friday announcements. Firms
announcing on Friday also have 26 percent smaller market capitalization.
Friday announcements are more prevalent toward the beginning of the sample period. In
general, 62.33 percent of announcements occur in the ﬁrst month of the quarter (January,
April, July, and October), 29.49 in the second month, and only 8.19 percent in the third
month. Friday announcements are less likely to occur in the ﬁrst month and more likely to
occur in the second or third month.
We include measures of corporate governance for a subset of ﬁr m s .T ot h ee x t e n tt h a tp o o r
governance is correlated with short-term value maximization, we expect Friday announcements
to be more likely for poorly-governed ﬁrms. Indeed, ﬁrms making Friday announcements are
less likely to have a block-shareholder (Cremers and Nair, 2004), and more likely to have poor
governance (Gompers et al., 2003), although the latter diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant.
Finally, Columns 5 and 6 present the summary statistics for the subsample of companies
with 10 to 90 percent of their announcements taking place on Friday. This criterion excludes
companies that rarely announce earnings on Friday (97,381 observations) or that almost always
announce earnings on Friday (178 observations), leaving a sample of 23,822 announcements. In
this sample, the summary statistics for announcements on Friday (Column 5) and other week-
5T h er e s u l t si nt h ep a p e ra r es i m i l a ri fw eu s er a wr e t u r n so rn e tr e t u r n s .
12days (Column 6) are substantially closer. The controls for month and market capitalization are
no longer signiﬁcantly diﬀerent, and the diﬀerence in the average year of announcement is re-
duced to less than three months. This subsample, labelled Homogeneous Sample, addresses to
some extent the concern that companies announcing on Friday may have unobservable features
that diﬀer from companies announcing on other days.
4 Stock return response
In this Section, we examine the responsiveness of stock returns to earnings surprises at various
horizons. We compare the responsiveness for announcements on Friday to the responsiveness
for announcements on other weekdays. If the fraction of distracted investors is higher on Friday,
there should be less immediate response to Friday announcements, followed by more delayed
response (Propositions 1 and 2). The long-term response should be the same (Proposition 3).
The fraction of the stock reaction occurring with delay should be higher for Friday announce-
ments (Corollary 1). We present graphical evidence, followed by an analysis of top and bottom
earnings quantiles including delayed response ratios, and by non-linear regressions.
4.1 Graphical evidence
To measure announcement quality6, we divide announcements into 11 bins, ordered by the
earnings surprise st,k. Negative earning surprises are in Quantiles 1 through 5, followed by zero
surprises (Quantile 6), and positive surprises (Quantiles 7 though 11). The thresholds for the
bins are set separately for each year to guarantee an equal number of non-Friday announcements
for bins 1 through 5 and bins 7 through 11. Since positive surprises are twice as common as
negative surprises, bins 7-11 have twice as many observations as bins 1-5. Within each bin, we
separate the Friday announcements from the non-Friday announcements.
Panel E in Appendix Table 2 reports the average earnings surprise st,k within each bin for
the Friday and the non-Friday announcements. The within-quantile earnings surprise average is
comparable for Friday and non-Friday announcements, except for the lowest bin. The average
earnings surprise in the bottom quantile is -.049, while it equals .015 in the top quantile.
Between bins 3 and 10 the average earning surprise is smaller in absolute value than .006.
Immediate response. In Figure 1a we display the immediate response of stock returns,
R
(0,1)
t,k , to earnings surprises for Friday and non-Friday announcements. (Panel A in Appen-
dix Table 2 reports the corresponding estimates). By construction, R
(0,1)
t,k is the return from
6An alternative measure of announcementq u a l i t yi st h ei m m e d i a t es t o c kr e t u r nR
(0,1)
t,k . This investor-based
measure has two drawbacks relative to the analyst-based measure that we employ. First, it does not allow for
separate estimation of immediate and delayed response. Second, it is endogenously determined by inattention.
For given level of the signal, a more extreme immediate stock response indicates that investors are less distracted.
13the close on the trading day before the earnings announcement to the close on the trading
day after the earnings announcement for stock k in quarter t. This measure captures the
short-term response to announcements made during trading hours and announcements made
after the market is closed.7 Compared to announcements on other days, the responsiveness of
stock prices to earning surprises is substantially ﬂatter for Friday announcements. Interest-
ingly, most of the underreaction occurs for positive announcements: companies with positive
announcements on Friday are signiﬁcantly penalized initially. However, even for negative an-
nouncements there is less initial reaction on Friday: stock returns for quantiles 1 through 5
are less negative for Friday than for non-Friday announcements.
Delayed response. In Figure 1b we display the delayed reaction of stock returns, R
(2,75)
t,k ,
to the earnings announcements. In the non-Friday sample, positive earnings surprises are
followed by positive returns in the period subsequent to the announcement, and the pattern
is increasing in the magnitude of the surprise. Negative surprises are followed by negative
delayed returns, but the magnitudes are smaller. In the Friday sample, the delayed response
to positive surprises follows a similar pattern to the one in the non-Friday sample. In addition,
there are large negative returns for the most negative surprises. Considering both positive and
negative surprises, Friday announcements exhibit more delayed response.
Long-term response. In Figure 1c we display the total response of stock return, R
(0,75)
t,k ,
to earnings surprises. The response is similar for announcements on Friday and other weekdays.
4.2 Top and bottom quantiles
To quantify the graphical ﬁndings, we examine the stock response to very positive and to very
negative earnings news. We measure the sensitivity to news as the diﬀerence in returns between
the top and bottom quantiles of earnings surprises. We compare the immediate, delayed, and
long-term sensitivity for Friday and non-Friday announcements. The OLS speciﬁcation is
R
(h,H)








t,k + Γ0Xt,k + Γ1d
top
t,kXt,k + εt,k, (9)
where R
(h,H)
t,k denotes the abnormal stock returns for company k in quarter t between h days
before the announcement and H days after the announcement. The sample includes only
observations in the top quantile(s) (d
top
t,k = 1) or the bottom quantile(s) (d
top
t,k = 0). We focus
on the coeﬃcients φT−B and φF
T−B. The coeﬃcient φT−B measures the return to good news
(top quantile) relative to bad news (bottom quantile) for non-Friday announcements. The
coeﬃcient φF
T−B captures the additional diﬀerential response for Friday relative to non-Friday
announcements. Under the null hypothesis of constant (or no) investor distraction, φF
T−B
should equal zero. Under the alternative hypothesis of higher distraction on Friday, φF
T−B
7Since time stamp for the announcements is not available, we cannot separate announcements made during
trading hours or after close.
14should be negative for the immediate response (R
(0,1)
t,k ) and positive for the delayed response
(R
(2,75)
t,k ). Distracted investors react less to news early on and more later on.
Speciﬁcation (9) includes a vector of controls Xt,k that are also interacted with the earnings
surprise indicator d
top
t,k.T h i ss p e c i ﬁcation allows the stock response to depend on a set of control
variables. For example, the responsiveness of stocks to earnings news may be correlated with
company size if proﬁt shocks are more permanent for larger ﬁrms. Similarly, the responsiveness
may have increased with time if earnings disclosure regulation decreased the pre-announcement
leakage of information. We include indicators for year of announcement, as well as 10 step
functions for market capitalization. The indicators for market capitalization are constructed
from log(pt,knt,k) −
PK
k=1 log(pt,knt,k)/K, that is, log market capitalization for company k in
quarter t minus the average market capitalization for other companies making announcements
in the same quarter. We also include month indicators to control for diﬀerences in return
sensitivity across quarters and within a quarter (early versus late releases). Standard errors
are clustered by day of announcement to control for correlation of returns on the same day.
Immediate response. Table 2A presents speciﬁcation (9) with the immediate stock
return R
(0,1)
t,k as dependent variable. Without controls (Column 1), the top-to-bottom average
return for non-Friday announcements is 6.59 percent (ˆ φT−B = .0659). Compared to this value,
the top-to-bottom return for a Friday announcement is signiﬁcantly smaller by 1.23 percentage
points (ˆ φF
T−B = −.0123), an 18.6 percent (ˆ φF
T−B/ˆ φT−B = −.0123/.0659) diﬀerence.
With controls (Column 2), the coeﬃcient ˆ φT−B (calculated at the average level of the con-
trols) is similar to the estimate without controls. The top-minus-bottom return diﬀerential for
Friday announcements is -.95 percent (ˆ φF
T−B = −.0095), marginally signiﬁcant, corresponding
t oa1 3 .9 percent (−.0095/.0682) eﬀect. In Column 3 we present the results (with controls)
for the Homogeneous Sample deﬁned in Section 3. In this substantially smaller sample (5,057
observations), the coeﬃcient φF
T−B is still negative (ˆ φF
T−B = −.0055), but not signiﬁcant.
I nC o l u m n s4 ,5 ,a n d6o fT a b l e2 Aw er e p l i c a t es p e c i ﬁcation (9) on the observations in the
top 2 and bottom 2 quantiles. (The variable d
top
t,k is now an indicator for the top 2 quantiles.)
The larger sample increases substantially the precision of the estimates. The top-to-bottom
return diﬀerential for non-Friday announcements is 5.78 percent (ˆ φT−B = .0578). Relative
to this diﬀerential, Friday announcements are associated with a 18.8 percent (0.0109/0.0578)
lower immediate return response, an economically and statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence. After
the introduction of controls (Column 5), the Friday top-to-bottom return diﬀerential is still
signiﬁcant (ˆ φF
T−B = −.0087). In the Homogeneous Sample (Column 6), the ˆ φF
T−B coeﬃcient
is still negative (ˆ φF
T−B = −.0062), but not signiﬁcant.
Delayed response. I nT a b l e2 Bw ee s t i m a t es p e c i ﬁcation (9) with the delayed abnormal
stock performance R
(2,75)
t,k as dependent variable8. In this speciﬁcation, the coeﬃcient φT−B
is a measure of the post-earnings-announcement drift for non-Friday announcements. In the
8The results are similar if we use alternative horizons such as (2,60), or (2,90). The advantage of adopting
15sample with no controls (Column 1), the estimated drift ˆ φT−B for non-Friday announcements
equals 5.50 percent, a substantial amount consistent with previous estimates (Bernard and
Thomas, 1990). For Friday announcements, the drift is signiﬁcantly bigger by 3.80 percentage
points (ˆ φF
T−B = .0380). As a share of the non-Friday drift, the delayed response on Friday is
69 percent larger (ˆ φF
T−B/ˆ φT−B = .0380/.0550). After controlling for year, month, and market
capitalization indicators (Column 2), the coeﬃcient ˆ φF
T−B is .0327, marginally signiﬁcant. In
the Homogeneous Sample (Column 3), the drift is 5.27 percentage points larger on Friday
(ˆ φF
T−B = .0527), a signiﬁcant diﬀerence. In this sample, the Friday drift is 124.6 percent
(.0527/.0423) larger than on other weekdays.
For announcements in the top 2 and bottom 2 quantiles (Column 4), the drift for Friday
announcements is 57 percent larger (ˆ φF
T−B/ˆ φT−B = .0261/.0455), a signiﬁcant diﬀerence. The
estimates for this sample resemble the estimates obtained using only the extreme quantiles.
The Friday diﬀerential drift becomes marginally signiﬁcant after introducing controls (Column
5). In the Homogeneous Sample (Column 6), the diﬀerential Friday drift is signiﬁcant (ˆ φF
T−B =
.0307) and larger than in the baseline sample (Columns 4 and 5).
Long-term response. I nT a b l e2 Cw em e a s u r et h ed i ﬀerence in long-term returns R
(0,75)
t,k
between the top 1 (or 2) quantiles and the bottom 1 (or 2) quantiles of the earnings surprise.
For the six speciﬁcations used in Tables 2A and 2B, the top-bottom return diﬀerential on non-
Fridays varies from 12.56 percent (ˆ φT−B = .1256, Column 1) to 9.40 percent (ˆ φT−B = .0940,
Column 6). For these same speciﬁcations, the top-to-bottom diﬀerential response on Fridays
ˆ φF
T−B is positive, but not signiﬁcantly so (except for a marginal signiﬁcance in Column 3).
Long-term stock returns are similar for Friday and non-Friday announcements.
Summary. Stock prices respond less to Friday earnings surprises than to non-Friday
earnings surprises in the immediate period (0,1), though this eﬀect is not signiﬁcant in the
Homogeneous Sample. In the later period (2,75), stock prices respond more to Friday earn-
ing surprises. Summing these two eﬀects in the event window (0,75), there is no signiﬁcant
diﬀerential long-term eﬀect of Friday announcements. These patterns are consistent with the
predictions of the model if more investors are inattentive to the information released on Friday.
For Friday announcements, inattention leads to less initial response, followed by more delayed
response, as investors become aware of the neglected information.
4.3 Delayed response ratio
We implement a uniﬁed test of the model, suggested by Corollary 19. We compute the share of
the total stock response to announcements (R
(0,75)
t,k )t h a to c c u r sw i t hd e l a y( R
(2,75)
t,k ). We then
test whether the delayed response ratio (DRR) is higher for Friday announcements. There
(2,75) is that it is the shortest horizon that typically includes the next earnings announcement.
9We thank Owen Lamont for suggesting this approach.
16are two advantages of this methodology: (i) it controls for any heterogeneity in the long-
term reaction for Friday and non-Friday announcements by renormalizing with the long-term
reaction; (ii) it oﬀers an easily interpretable measure of the delay.
In Table 2D, we compute numerator and denominator of DRR as the diﬀerence in average
returns between announcements in the top and bottom quantile, as in Section 4.2. The measure
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T−B is the coeﬃcient φT−B e s t i m a t e di n( 9 )w i t hR
(2,75)
k,t as dependent variable (and
similarly for φ
(0,75)
T−B ) (Tables 2B and 2C). The standard errors for DRR are derived using the
Delta method. In the benchmark speciﬁcation without controls (Column 1), 43.80 percent of
the top-to-bottom stock response is delayed. The results are remarkably similar with controls
(Column 2)10, in the Homogeneous Sample (Column 3), and using the top 2 and bottom
2 quantiles (Columns 4 through 6). For these diﬀerent speciﬁcations, the average delayed
response ratio consistently lies between .40 and .44.
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In the benchmark speciﬁcation (Column 1), 62.87 percent of the top-to-bottom response on
Friday occurs with delay (DRRF = .6287). Compared to the delayed response ratio of .4380
on other weekdays, Fridays have an additional 19 percentage points of delayed reaction, an
economically and statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence. The introduction of controls (Column 2),
the estimation using the Homogeneous Sample (Column 3), and using the top 2 and bottom 2
quantiles (Columns 4 through 6) has little eﬀect on the results.
The delayed response ratios (10) and (11) are computed using the diﬀerence in returns
between the top and bottom quantiles. We now consider whether the ﬁndings depend more
on the response to positive announcements (top quantile) or negative announcements (bottom
quantile). We compute the delayed response ratio separately for quantile j, with j =1 ,2,10,11
(Figure 2a). The numerator and denominator of DRR are estimated using the diﬀerence
between expected returns in quantile j and expected returns in quantile 6.
For non-Friday announcements, the delayed response ratio is substantially smaller for nega-
tive announcements (.25 and .06) than for positive announcements (.54 and .53). There is more
evidence of underreaction for positive than for negative announcements. Friday announcements
have higher delay ratios, except in quantile 2. At the very bottom, the ratio for Friday (.54)
10In the speciﬁcations with controls, we estimate the eﬀe c ta tt h ea v e r a g ev a l u eo ft h ec o n t r o l s .
17is more than twice as large as for non-Fridays (.25). At the top, the delayed response ratio is
15 to 20 percentage points larger on Friday, a diﬀerence that is signiﬁcant in quantiles 10 and
11. The results are similar with controls and in the Homogeneous Sample (results not shown).
Summary. For non-Friday announcements, 40 to 44 percent of the stock response is de-
layed. For Friday announcements, this ﬁgure is 56 to 64 percent. The substantially higher
delayed response ratio for Friday announcements is consistent with increased distraction post-
poning investor response on Friday. This pattern is observable both for positive and for negative
surprises, although the results are less precise for negative surprises.
4.4 Non-linear regressions
In the OLS regressions above, we have restricted the attention to very positive and very negative
earnings news. While this approach is simple and non-parametric, it does not take advantage
of all available information. In order to use all the data, we impose identiﬁcation restrictions
on the relationship between earnings surprises and stock returns. We focus this Section on the
immediate stock response R
(0,1)
t,k .11
While the return R
(0,1)
t,k is approximately a linear function of the surprise quantiles (Figure
1a), it is not a linear function of the earnings surprise st,k. Figure 2b plots the average return
R
(0,1)
t,k as a function of the average earnings surprise st,k by quantile. The relationship between
returns and surprises is monotonic but highly non-linear, with a clear S-shape (Kothari, 2001).
The responsiveness of stocks to earnings surprises declines the larger the absolute value of
the earning surprise. This observed non-linearity is consistent with the model in Section 2 if
the measurement error of the earnings surprise is increasing in the magnitude of the observed
surprise or if the cashﬂow news embedded in large earnings surprises is less persistent.
A second feature of Figure 2b is that the sensitivity to announcements on Friday is approx-
imately proportional to the sensitivity on other days. Given these two features, we impose
a proportionality restriction, while allowing for a non-linear shape of returns to earnings an-
nouncements. We estimate the non-linear regression:
R
(0,1)











The coeﬃcients αj capture the average immediate stock return for non-Friday announcements
in quantile j (d
j
t,k = 1) relative to quantile 6 (no surprise). The coeﬃcients αj +α6, therefore,
correspond to the average returns by quantile presented in Figure 1a. The coeﬃcient φF is
the proportional increase (or decrease) in the return responsiveness for Friday vs. non-Friday
announcements. Finally, we impose a similar proportionality restriction for the standard set
of controls, where c is the set of year, month, and size indicators.
11Unfortunately, for the delayed response R
(2,75)
t,k a proportionality restriction like the one that we apply for
R
(0,1)
t,k is not consistent with Figure 1b.
18Column 1 in Table 3 presents the results of speciﬁcation (12) without control variables on
the full sample of 121,381 observations. The R2 of .0514 is substantially higher than the R2 of
0.0085 for a linear speciﬁcation R
(0,1)
t,k = α + α1st,k + φFst,kdF
t,k + γdF
t,k + εt,k.T h ec o e ﬃcients
αj are precisely estimated and are monotonic in the surprise quantile j, mirroring the patterns
in Figure 1a. For example, relative to quantile 6, quantile 1 is associated with -3.06 percent
returns (α1 = −.0306), and quantile 11 with 3.54 percent returns (α11 = .0354). Turning to
the main prediction of the model, the relationship between earnings surprises and immediate
stock returns is 18.74 percent ﬂatter for Friday announcements (ˆ φF = −.1874). The eﬀect is
precisely estimated and consistent with the ﬁnding of an 18.6 percent lower immediate response
for the extreme quantiles (Table 2A). In Column 2 we introduce the controls for year, month,
and size. The eﬀect of the controls (not shown in Table 3A) is to increase the stock response
to earnings announcements for the more recent years, for mid-size ﬁrms, and for December
announcements. With these controls, the immediate stock reaction is 16.33 percent ﬂatter for
Friday announcements (ˆ φF = −.1633), a signiﬁcant diﬀerence.
In Column 3 we allow for a diﬀerent response on each weekday:
R
(0,1)


















t,k are indicator variables for announcement of company k in quarter t in weekday w
(Wednesday is the omitted category). The immediate stock response is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
(lower) only for Friday announcements.
We consider an alternative functional form employing the inverse tangent (arctan) function
(Kothari, 2001) instead of a step function as in (12) and (13):
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This function produces the S-shaped pattern evident in Figure 2b with only three parameters
(φ0,φ 1, and φ2). In addition, the parameter φpos permits a diﬀerent sensitivity to positive
surprises (dpos)r e l a t i v et on e g a t i v es u r p r i s e s . I nt h i ss p e c i ﬁcation (Column 4), the R2 is
slightly higher than the R2 for the baseline speciﬁcation (Column 2), even though the arctan
function has 5, rather than 12 parameters. The immediate stock returns are 22.24 percent more
responsive to positive surprises than to negative surprises (ˆ φpos = .2224). Most importantly,
this responsiveness is 15.52 percent ﬂatter for Friday announcements (ˆ φF = −.1552). The
result is precisely estimated and the point estimate is very similar to the estimate obtained
using the baseline speciﬁcation (16.33 percent).
In the Homogeneous Sample (Column 5), stock returns in the short-run respond 12.52
percent less to Friday earning surprises than to non-Friday earning surprises. Given the smaller
sample, the result is less precisely estimated and only marginally signiﬁcant, but the point
estimate is comparable to the one based on the whole sample (16.33 percent).
19To remove the eﬀect of potential earnings surprise outliers, we replicate the speciﬁcations
in Columns 2 and 5 for the 121,381 announcements with abs(st,k) <. 02, that is, with sur-
prises that do not exceed two percent of market capitalization.12 For this sample, the Fri-
day coeﬃcient φFis actually more negative: the stock response to earnings announcements is
20.94 percent ﬂatter than on other weekdays (Column 6). In the Homogeneous Sample with
abs(st,k) <. 02 (Column 7), the Friday eﬀect is a signiﬁcant 17.74 percent.
So far, we have shown that the same-day and next-day stock reaction is ﬂattened for Friday
announcements. Ideally, we would like to test whether the ﬂattening occurs on Friday, before
the weekend, or on Monday, after the weekend. However, this comparison requires that the
fraction of announcements taking place after market close be similar for Friday and non-Friday
announcements. Unfortunately, Friday announcements during the recent years are signiﬁcantly
less likely to occur after hours (Bagnoli et al., 2004), making a direct comparison impossible.
Summary. Friday announcements are associated with a 12 to 21 percent lower response of
stock prices in the two days surrounding the announcement. These results are not sensitive to
the introduction of controls or speciﬁcation modiﬁcations, and are consistent with the results
obtained using only the top and bottom quantile (Table 2A). The decreased initial response
ﬁts the hypothesis that Friday and the weekend temporarily distract investors.
5V o l u m e r e s p o n s e
In the previous Section, we documented that the immediate stock response to Friday earnings
announcements is substantially lower than for non-Friday announcements. If this diﬀerence
is caused by investor distraction associated with the weekend, we expect that fewer investors
should place trades in response to Friday news. In this Section, we test if, indeed, the abnormal
volume around the announcement day is lower for Friday than for non-Friday announcements.13



















t,k is the value of the shares traded on the τ-th trading day after the earning announce-
ment in quarter t of company k. The measure ∆v
(h,H)
t,k is the percentage increase in volume
around announcement date at horizon (h,H), relative to baseline volume for stock k in quarter
τ.I np a r t i c u l a r ,∆v
(0,1)
t,k is the immediate abnormal volume due to the announcement.
Graphical evidence. Figure 3 plots the average abnormal volume ∆v
(h,H)
t,k at various
horizons. We consider ﬁrst the non-Friday announcements. Abnormal trading volume is es-
sentially zero two days before the announcement and is about 5 percent the day before. The
12The results are similar for other thresholds, such as trimming 2 or 5 percent of the most extreme surprises.
13This prediction does not follow from the model because it has no natural deﬁnition of trading volume.
20abnormal volume increases to 45 percent on the day of the announcement, to 58 percent on
the next trading day, and then it decays slowly. A week after the announcement, the trading
volume is still 12 percent higher than in the baseline period.
Next, we consider the Friday announcements. The measures of abnormal volume are very
similar to the non-Friday announcements for the days preceding the announcement. On an-
nouncement day, abnormal volume is 10 percent higher for Friday announcements. Most
importantly, abnormal volume is 40 percent lower on the day after the announcement. On
trading days τ +2a n dτ + 3, the Friday and non-Friday series are again very similar. On
trading days τ +4a n dτ + 5 abnormal volume is somewhat lower on Friday.
The main diﬀerence between Friday and non-Friday announcements occurs during the day
of and the day after the announcement. Abnormal volume ∆v
(0,1)
t,k is substantially lower for




t,k need to be
considered together because the share of after-hour announcements is lower on Friday, as dis-
cussed in Section 4.4) Our interpretation of this ﬁnding is that the weekend distracts investors.
Consequently, trade does not increase as much in response to new information released on
Friday. This interpretation also suggests why the diﬀerence between Friday and non-Friday
announcements mostly disappears by day τ +2. Twooﬀsetting forces are at work. On the one
hand, some of the investors that have been distracted by the weekend are still not trading. On
the other hand, other investors trade to respond to the underreaction after the weekend.
Regressions. We test whether the ﬁnding of lower abnormal volume ∆v
(0,1)
t,k for Friday
announcements is aﬀected by adding control variables. We run the OLS speciﬁcation
∆v
(0,1)






t,k + ΓXt,k + εt,k. (16)
The terms d
j
t,k are indicators for earning surprises st,k in the j-th quantile, with quantile 6
(sk,t = 0) as the omitted category. The control variables Xt,k, as usual, are month, year,
and size indicators. In the speciﬁcation without controls (Column 1 of Table 4) the abnormal
volume is increasing in the absolute value of the earnings surprise. It is lowest for the case
of no-surprise (43.93 percent) and it equals 57.75 percent for the most negative and 66.41
percent for the most positive surprise. Most importantly, the Friday coeﬃc i e n ti sn e g a t i v ea n d
signiﬁcant, ˆ φF = −.1052. Compared to the average immediate volume increase on non-Fridays,
.5161, the abnormal volume increase on Friday is .1052/.5161 = 20.3 percent lower.
In Column 2 we introduce the controls. The abnormal volume is lowest in years 1999-2002,
for larger ﬁrms and during the peak of the earnings season (April, July, and October). With
controls, the Friday eﬀect is larger (ˆ φF = −.1243). In Column 3 we introduce ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects
to control for company-level diﬀerences in abnormal volume that are not captured by the
controls. This speciﬁcation reduces the diﬀerential volume increase for Friday announcements
to a still highly signiﬁcant ˆ φF = −0.0480. The decrease in the coeﬃcient indicates that some
21of the Friday eﬀect was due to heterogeneity in abnormal volume among ﬁrms. However, the
remaining Friday eﬀect is large and precisely estimated. When companies announce on Friday,
they have .0480/.5161 = 9.3 percent lower abnormal volume compared to when they announce
on another weekday. The 9.3 percent attenuation of abnormal volume is similar to the 12 to 20
percent ﬂattening of short-run stock returns (Tables 2A and 3). Since controlling for ﬁrm ﬁxed
eﬀects appears to be important, we include them in all the subsequent speciﬁcations. In Column
4, we estimate separate eﬀects for each weekday. Compared to Wednesday announcements,
Friday announcements have the lowest volume, followed by Thursday announcements. In the
Homogeneous Sample (Column 5), the abnormal volume is 0.0669/.5161 = 12.9 percent lower
for Friday announcements, a result larger than in the whole sample.
Abnormal volume is lower for Friday announcements, even after controlling for ﬁrm het-
erogeneity. This does not necessarily imply investor inattention. The lower abnormal volume
for Friday announcements may be explained by the well-known fact that aggregate market
volume is lower on Monday. Of course, our hypothesis predicts that aggregate volume should
be lower on Friday and Monday if investors are more distracted. Nevertheless, at the risk of
removing the aggregate impact of inattention, we include aggregate volume as an additional
control. We measure aggregate volume as the equal-weighted average across ﬁrms of the num-
ber of shares traded, divided by shares outstanding. We then generate the abnormal aggregate
volume ∆v
(0,1)
t,A using the same formula as in (15). After controlling for abnormal aggregate
volume (Column 6), Friday announcements have a 2.14 percent lower abnormal volume, but
the result is no longer signiﬁcant. In Column 7, we replicate this speciﬁcation for the Homo-
geneous Sample of Column 5. In this sample, abnormal volume for Friday announcements is
signiﬁcantly lower than on other weekdays by .0432/.5161 = 8.3 percent, even after controlling
for aggregate volume. Controlling for aggregate volume, therefore, lowers the eﬀect, but the
Friday result is still signiﬁcant in the Homogenous Sample.
Summary. Short-term abnormal volume is signiﬁcantly lower for Friday earnings an-
nouncements, even after controlling for announcement quality, control variables, and ﬁrm-
speciﬁc variation. The result holds even after controlling for aggregate market volume in one
of two samples. The Friday eﬀect in abnormal volume is of the same order of magnitude as
the Friday eﬀect in immediate returns. The volume results are consistent with the hypothesis
that investors underreact initially to information released on Friday.
6 Firm reaction
We interpret the evidence in the previous two Sections as suggesting that investors pay less
immediate attention to announcements occurring on Friday. If inattention is indeed higher on
Friday, the model in Section 2 predicts that earnings quality and returns should be lower for
Friday announcements, as long as some managers maximize short-term value. For example,
22managers may be interested in short-term value if they intend to exercise stock options in
the near future and they expect to release negative news. Given that they cannot exercise the
options before the earnings announcement due to insider trading regulation, a delayed response
to the news allows the managers to exercise the options at a higher price.
Graphical evidence. The ﬁrst measure of earnings quality is whether the company
announces negative operating proﬁts for the quarter. Companies manipulate earnings to avoid
announcing negative earnings (Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser, 1999). The frequency of
negative earnings announcements by day of week (Figure 4a) varies between .187 and .200
between Monday and Thursday. On Friday, the fraction of negative announcements is .240, 25
percent higher than on other weekdays.
The second measure of earnings quality is whether the earnings announcement falls short
of the consensus analyst forecast. On Monday through Thursday, the fraction of negative
surprises varies between .266 and .288 (Figure 4b). On Friday, instead, the fraction of negative
surprises is .400. Friday announcements, therefore, are 45 percent more likely to fail to meet
analyst expectations. Analyst forecasts do not fully reﬂect the extent of bad news on Friday.
While Figure 4b focuses on the fraction of announcements falling short of analyst expecta-
tions, Figure 5 presents the full distribution by earning surprise quantile. We ﬁnd three main
eﬀects. First, Friday surprises are almost twice as likely to be very negative (quantile 1) and
are substantially more likely to be in quantiles 2, 3, and 4. Second, Friday announcements are
twenty percent less likely to have a zero surprise (quantile 6). Third, Friday announcements
are less likely to be barely positive, but no less likely to be substantially positive (quantiles
10 and 11). An interpretation of these patterns is that some companies announce on Friday if
they have substantially negative earnings. In addition, if ﬁrms announce on Friday, they are
less likely to manipulate earnings in order to generate barely positive surprises.
The third measure of earnings quality is the abnormal stock return on the day of, and the
day after, the announcement, R
(0,1)
t,k . On Monday through Thursday the return varies between
-.0012 and .0021, while on Friday it equals -.0038 (Figure 4c). Average returns on Friday are 50
basis points lower than on other days. These results conﬁrm the earlier ﬁndings of Damodaran
(1989) for the period 1981 through 1985. Investors (as well as analysts) are surprised by the
extent of negative news released on Friday.
Regressions. While this evidence is suggestive of timing of negative news on Friday,
alternative interpretations are possible. Firms announcing on Friday may have unobservable
features that are associated with negative earnings surprises and abnormal returns. This
would also explain the ﬁndings in Damodaran (1989) and Bagnoli et al. (2004). To address
this explanation, we estimate speciﬁcations with controls and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. We adopt the
logit speciﬁcation:
qt,k =1i fq∗
t,k = φ0 + φFdF
t,k + ΓXt,k + εt,k ≥ 0 (17)
where qt,k is the (binary) measure of announcement quality by company k in quarter t, dF
t,k
23is an indicator for Friday announcement, Xt,k is the vector of controls, and εt,k has a logistic
distribution. We also estimate a conditional logit speciﬁcation, which includes ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects.
In both cases, we present the results as odds ratios, where the odds are deﬁned as the ratio of
the probability of a high-quality versus low-quality announcement, P (qt,k)/(1 − P (qt,k)).
The ﬁrst measure of earnings quality qt,k is an indicator variable for negative announcements
(Table 5A). Without controls (Column 1), the odds ratio for ˆ φF is 1.327, signiﬁcantly larger
than 1, indicating that Friday announcements are more likely to deliver negative earnings.
This corresponds to the ﬁnding in Figure 4a that Friday announcements are 25 percent more
likely to be negative. The odds ratio for ˆ φF is still signiﬁcantly larger than 1 after introduction
of controls (Column 2). In Column 3 we present the results of a conditional logit model, which
includes ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects.14 In this speciﬁcation, the dependent variable is identiﬁed only by
within-company diﬀerences in earnings quality between Friday and non-Friday announcements.
Unlike in the results in Columns 1 and 2, heterogeneity across companies does not contribute
to the identiﬁcation. In this speciﬁcation, the number of observations is lower, since any
company k for which the dependent variable et,k does not vary with time is automatically
dropped from the sample. With company ﬁxed eﬀects, the odds ratio for ˆ φF equals 1.759,
which is substantially larger than the benchmark odds ratio of 1.327. Of the other weekdays,
only Thursday has signiﬁcantly worse earnings than on Wednesday, although the eﬀect is only
one tenth of the Friday eﬀect (Column 4). Finally, in the Homogeneous Sample (Column 5),
the odds ratio is 1.617, still a very large eﬀect.
The second measure of earnings quality qt,k is an indicator variable for announcements with
negative surprises (Table 5B). Without control variables (Column 1), the odds ratio for ˆ φF
is 1.755, corresponding to the ﬁnding in Figure 4b that Friday announcements are 45 percent
more likely to disappoint analysts. The introduction of control variables (Column 2) and ﬁrm
ﬁxed eﬀects (Column 3) reduces the estimated diﬀerence. Even in the speciﬁcation with ﬁrm
ﬁxed eﬀects, though, the odds ratio for ˆ φF is 1.365, a large and precisely estimated eﬀect.
Friday earnings surprises are signiﬁcantly more likely to be negative than surprises announced
on any other weekday (Column 4). The results in the Homogeneous Sample (Column 5) are
similar to the baseline results in Column 3.
The third measure of earnings quality is the short-run abnormal stock return R
(0,1)
t,k (Table
5C). We estimate the OLS speciﬁcation:
R
(0,1)
t,k = φ0 + φFdF
t,k + ΓXt,k + εt,k.
The average return is 13 basis points for non-Friday announcements (ˆ φ0 = .0013) and -38 basis
points for Friday announcements (ˆ φ0+ ˆ φF = −.0038, Column 1). The 51 basis point diﬀerence
is large and signiﬁcant. This diﬀerence remains essentially unchanged after the introduction
14For the conditional logit speciﬁcations in Columns 3 and 4 we present unclustered robust standard errors.
Clustering by day is not possible with this speciﬁcation.
24of controls (Column 2) and of company ﬁxed eﬀects (Column 3). Compared to Wednesday
announcements, Friday announcements, and (to a lesser extent) Monday announcements, have
lower average returns (Column 4). Finally, the diﬀerence of returns is similar in the Homoge-
neous Sample (Column 5).
Summary. Companies release more negative announcements on Friday, even after con-
trolling for ﬁrm-speciﬁc announcement behavior. Analysts as well as investors appear to be
surprised by the lower quality of the earnings surprise announced on Friday. The manager-
based evidence of strategic news release supports the investor-based ﬁnding of inattention on
Friday. Managers act as if distracted investors aﬀect stock prices.
7 Alternative interpretations
In this Section we consider two standard explanations of the ﬁndings, pre-announcement release
and ﬁrm heterogeneity. We also discuss an attention-related interpretation that is inconsistent
with the data.
Pre-announcement release. Companies release in advance the date of the earnings
announcements. In the event of poor performance, companies may also issue earnings warn-
ings. These pre-announcement releases could explain the lower immediate reaction of stock
prices to Friday announcements. Assume that ﬁrms announcing on Friday are more likely
to issue earnings warnings. Additionally, the decision to announce on Friday, itself, could be
interpreted as a warning about earnings. Stock prices may respond to this news before the
oﬃcial earnings announcement. Because the consensus forecast is not always revised after
these pre-announcements, the negative surprises constructed from the consensus forecast may
overestimate the actual magnitude of the surprise to investors. This hypothesis can explain a
lower short-term reaction of stock returns to negative surprises. However, it does not explain
the attenuated short-term reaction for positive surprises. If anything, it predicts a stronger
short-term response to positive announcements. This interpretation is also unable to explain
diﬀerential drift. Further, we can directly test whether investors perceive more negative news
before Friday releases. Figure 1d display stock returns for the horizon (-30,-1) as a function of
the quantiles of earnings surprises. The pre-announcement returns are very similar for Friday
and non-Friday announcements.
Firm heterogeneity. The attenuated immediate response on Friday could be due to un-
observed heterogeneity. For example, the news about future proﬁtability embedded in earnings
announcements may be more transitory for ﬁrms making Friday announcements. While it is
impossible to fully control for ﬁrm heterogeneity, we show that the results remain qualitatively
unchanged after the introduction of time, company, and market capitalization controls. In ad-
dition, heterogeneity is unlikely to simultaneously produce less immediate response and more
delayed response for Friday announcements. Finally, if ﬁrm heterogeneity is also responsible
25for the results, it should also explain why earnings surprises and returns are worse for Friday
announcements even after introducing ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects.
Task overload. An attention-related interpretation is that investors on Monday are over-
burdened by the information that has accumulated on their desks during the weekend and
they ﬁnd less time to react to Friday earnings announcements. Two pieces of evidence are not
consistent with this interpretation. First, the stock return and volume response to Monday
announcements does not appear to be attenuated (Column 4 in Tables 3 and 4). Second, if
traders are overburdened by information on Monday we should expect aggregate high trading
volume on Monday. Instead, aggregate volume is 10 percent lower on Monday.
8C o n c l u s i o n
We have compared the reaction to earnings announcements on Friday to the reaction on other
weekdays. Friday announcements are characterized by a lower immediate, and a higher delayed,
response. The delayed response as a percentage of the total response is 60 percent on Friday
and 40 percent on other weekdays. We observe parallel results for volume. Abnormal volume
increase around the day of announcement is 10 percent smaller for Friday announcements than
for non-Friday announcements.
The evidence supports the inattention hypothesis. On Friday, investors are distracted from
work-related activities. Given limited attention, distractions cause underreaction to the earn-
ings information. Eventually, investors realize the mispricing and incorporate the information.
Firms respond to investor inattention by releasing worse announcements on Friday. This
strategic behavior takes analysts as well as investors by surprise. Friday announcements are
45 percent more likely to miss analyst expectations. These announcements are also associated
with an abnormal stock return that is 50 basis points lower.
Our results contribute to the debate on the causes of momentum and post-announcement
drift. The evidence that a distracting event increases the delayed reaction supports the theory
that underreaction to new information is a source of the drift.
The strategic release of worse news on Friday appears to occur in other domains beyond
corporate decisions. In ongoing work, we show that on Friday or on a weekend the Unites States
President is 10 percent less likely to sign legislation that is likely to be politically popular.
Interestingly, our ﬁndings for ﬁnancial markets suggest that releasing negative information on
Friday has only a temporary eﬀect. Whether or not the strategic release of political news has
permanent eﬀects is an open question.
26AA p p e n d i x
Time-invariant perceived variances. We show that σ2
µ,t,P+D and σ2
1−µ,t,P+D do not depend
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since st and εt+1 are independent of each other and of all the other variables. Similarly, one








ε. Neither expression depends on t, if the
strategic behavior of managers is time-invariant (as shown in proposition 4).
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which implies that bh >b l.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 .(i) By the deﬁnition of IRt,
Et [IRt]=Et [Zt − Et−1[Zt] − (Dt − Et−1[Dt])] = Pt − Et−1[Pt]=
= −
at − ¯ a
1+R
+
(1 − bt)st − Et−1 [(1 − bt)st]
1+R
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The proof of (ii) follows from bh >b l. Q.E.D.
27P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 .(i) We calculate Et[Zt+1].
Et[Zt+1]=Et [Pt+1 + Dt+1 − (1 + R)Pt]
=
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This implies Et[DRt]=Et[Zt+1]−Et−1[Zt+1]=at −¯ a+btst −Et−1 [btst]=at −¯ a−σbs +btst.
The proof of (ii) follows from bh >b l. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 .(i) Notice that Zt+1,t−1 can be rewritten as Zt+1 +( 1+R)Zt.
We can substitute this expression for Zt+1,t−1 into the expression for Et[LRt+1] (in the text)
to obtain
Et[LRt+1]=[ ( Et [Zt] − Et−1 [Zt−1]) − (Et[Dt] − Et−1 [Dt])] +





Parts (ii) and (iii) follow from this expression for Et[LRt+1] and Propositions 1 and 2. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 . Parts (i) and (iii) are discussed in the body of the paper.
We prove part (ii). The problem (7) of the short-term manager is equivalent to solving
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Multiplying the terms together and simplifying leads to µhst − γσ2
sµl ≤ µlst − γσ2
sµh, and
ﬁnally to st ≤− σ2
sγ, the desired condition. Given this threshold rule, E [st|µt = µh] < 0a n d
E [st|µt = µl] > 0 follow immediately. Hence, E [st|µt = µh] <E[st|µt = µl]. The relationship
E [IRt|µt = µh] <E[IRt|µt = µl] follows from






E [st|µt = µh] −
1 − bl
1+R
E [st|µt = µl]
because al − ah < 0, E [st|µt = µh] < 0, and E [st|µt = µl] > 0. Q.E.D.
28References
[1] Bagnoli, Mark, Michael B. Clement, and Susan B. Watts. “The Timing of Earnings An-
nouncements Throughout the Day and Throughout the Week”, mimeo, 2004.
[2] Baker, Malcolm, Richard Ruback, and Jeﬀrey Wurgler. “Behavioral Corporate Finance:
A Survey.” In The Handbook of Corporate Finance: Empirical Corporate Finance, edited
by Espen Eckbo. New York: Elsevier/North Holland, forthcoming.
[3] Barber, Brad M. and Terrance Odean. “All that Glitters: The Eﬀect of Attention and
News on the Buying Behavior of Individual and Institutional Investors”, mimeo, 2002.
[4] Barberis, Nicholas, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny. “A model of investor sentiment”,
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 49, 307-343, 1998.
[5] Begley, Joy and Paul Fischer. “Is there Information in an Earnings Announcement De-
lay?”, Review of Accounting Studies, Vol. 3, 347-364, 1998.
[6] Bernard, Victor L. and Jacob K. Thomas. “Post-Earnings-Announcement Drift: Delayed
P r i c eR e s p o n s eo rR i s kP r e m i u m ? ” ,Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 27, 1-36, 1989.
[7] Bernard, Victor L. and Jacob K. Thomas. “Evidence That Stock Price Do Not Fully
Reﬂect the Implications of Current Earnings For Future Earnings”, Journal of Accounting
and Economics, Vol. , 305-340, 1990.
[8] Chan, Louis, Narasimham Jegadeesh, and Josef Lakonishok. “Momentum Strategies”,
Journal of Finance, Vol. 51, 1681-1713, 1996.
[9] Cremers, K.J. Martijn and Vinay B. Nair. “Governance Mechanisms and Equity Prices,”
mimeo, 2004.
[10] Damodaran, Aswath. “The Weekend Eﬀect in Information: A Study of Earnings and
Dividend Announcements”, Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 4, 607-623, 1989.
[11] Daniel, Kent, David Hirshleifer, and Avanidhar Subrahmanyam. “Investor Psychology
and Security Market Under-and Overreactions”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 53, 1839-1885,
1998.
[12] Degeorge, Francois, Jay Patel, and Richard Zeckhauser. “Earnings Management to Exceed
Thresholds”, Journal of Business, Vol. 72, 1-33, 1999.
[13] DellaVigna, Stefano and Ulrike Malmendier. “Contract Design and Self-Control: Theory
and Evidence”, Quarterly Journal of Economics,Vol. 119, 353—402, 2004.
[14] DellaVigna, Stefano and Joshua M. Pollet. “Attention, Demographics, and the Stock
Market”, mimeo, 2005.
[15] DeLong, J. Bradford, Andrei Shleifer, Lawrence H. Summers, Robert J. Waldmann. “Noise
Trader Risk in Financial Markets”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98, 703-738, 1990.
[16] Dyck, Alexander and Luigi Zingales. “The Media and Asset Prices”, mimeo, 2003.
29[17] Frazzini, Andrea. “The Disposition Eﬀect and Under-Reaction to News”, mimeo, 2004.
[18] Gabaix, Xavier and David Laibson. “Shrouded Attributes and Information Suppression
in Competitive Markets”, mimeo, 2004.
[19] Gabaix, Xavier, David Laibson, Guillermo Moloche and Stephen Weinberg.“The Alloca-
tion of Attention: Theory and Evidence”, mimeo, 2002.
[20] Glaeser, Edward. “The Political Economy of Hatred”, Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Vol. 120, 45-86, 2005.
[21] Gompers, Paul, Joy Ishii, and Andrew Metrick. “Corporate Governance and Equity
Prices”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 118, 107-155, 2003.
[22] Graham, John R., Campbell R. Harvey, and Shiva Rajgopal. “The Economic Implications
of Corporate Financial Reporting”, mimeo, 2004.
[23] Grinblatt, Mark and Bing Han. “The Disposition Eﬀect and Momentum”, mimeo, 2002.
[24] Hirshleifer, David and Siew Hong Teoh. “Limited Attention, Information Disclosure, and
Financial Reporting”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 36, 337-386, 2003.
[25] Hong, Harrison and Jeremy Stein. “A Uniﬁed Theory of Underreaction, Momentum Trad-
ing, and Overreaction in Asset Markets”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 54, 2143-2184, 1999.
[26] Huberman, Gur, and Tomer Regev. “Contagious Speculation and a Cure for Cancer: A
Nonevent that Made Stock Prices Soar”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 56, 387-396, 2001.
[27] Jegadeesh, Narasimhan, and Sheridan Titman. “Returns to Buying Winners and Selling
Losers: Implications For Stock Market Eﬃciency”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 48, 65-91,
1993.
[28] Keim, Donald and Robert Stambaugh. “A Further Investigation of the Weekend Eﬀect in
Stock Returns”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 39, 819-835, 1984.
[29] Kothari, S.P. “Capital Markets Research in Accounting”, Journal of Accounting and Eco-
nomics, Vol. 31, 105-231, 2001.
[30] Lakonishok, Josef and Maurice Levi. “Weekend Eﬀects on Stock Return: A Note”, Journal
of Finance, Vol. 38, 883-889, 1982.
[31] Moskowitz, Tobias J. and Mark Grinblatt. “Do Industries Explain Momentum?”, Journal
of Finance, Vol. 54, 1249-1290, 1999.
[32] Patell, James M. and Mark A. Wolfson, “Good News, Bad News and the Intraday Timing
of Corporate Disclosures”, The Accounting Review, pp. 509—527, 1982.
[33] Shleifer, Andrei. Ineﬃcient Markets: An Introduction to Behavioral Finance. Clarendon
Lectures in Economics. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.
30  31
Figures 1a-1d. Stock Response to Earnings Surprise at Different Horizons 
 


























































































Notes: The cumulative abnormal return for each stock is the raw buy-and-hold return, adjusted using the estimated beta 
from market model. Quantiles 1 through 5 contain earnings announcements for five quintiles of negative earnings 
surprises and quantiles 7 through 11 contain earnings surprises for 5 quintiles of positive earnings surprises. Quantile 6 
contains all announcements with an earnings surprise equal to zero.   32
 





























































































Notes: The cumulative abnormal return for each stock is the raw buy-and-hold return, adjusted using the estimated beta 
from market model. Quantiles 1 through 5 contain earnings announcements for five quintiles of negative earnings 
surprises and quantiles 7 through 11 contain earnings surprises for 5 quintiles of positive earnings surprises. Quantile 6 
contains all announcements with an earnings surprise equal to zero. 
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Notes: The cumulative abnormal return for each stock is the raw buy-and-hold return, adjusted using the estimated beta 
from market model. Quantiles 1 through 5 contain earnings announcements for five quintiles of negative earnings 
surprises and quantiles 7 through 11 contain earnings surprises for 5 quintiles of positive earnings surprises. Quantile 6 
contains all announcements with an earnings surprise equal to zero. In Figure 2a, the Delayed Response Ratio for 
quantile j is computed as (Average (2,75) Returns to Quantile j – Average (2,75) Returns for Quantile 6) / (Average (0,75) 
Returns to Quantile j – Average (0,75) Returns for Quantile 6). The Delayed Response Ratio on Friday and on other 
weekdays is significantly different at the 5% level for Quantiles 10 and 11. In Figure 2b, the Quantiles are plotted at the 
average value of the earnings surprise for that Quantile.   34
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Notes: In event time, day 0 is the day of the earnings announcement. The abnormal volume for each stock for a given event period is the average daily log volume during the period 
divided by the average log volume for the period -20 to -11 in event time (10 trading days). The earnings surprise for a particular quarterly announcement is the difference between 
actual earnings per share for the quarter recorded by I/B/E/S and the median analyst forecast included in the I/B/E/S detail file during the 30 days before the quarterly earnings 
announcement scaled by the stock price 5 trading days before the announcement.   35
Figure 4. Firm Timing of Earnings Announcements 
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Notes: The earnings surprise for a particular quarterly announcement is the difference between actual earnings for the quarter recorded by I/B/E/S and the median analyst forecast 
included in the I/B/E/S detail file during the 30 days before the quarterly earnings announcement scaled by the stock price 5 trading days before the announcement. Quantiles 1 
through 5 contain earnings announcements for five quintiles of negative earnings surprises and quantiles 7 through 11 contain earnings surprises for 5 quintiles of positive earnings 
surprises. Quantile number 6 contains all announcements with an earnings surprise equal to zero. Since the number of negative earnings surprises, the number of surprises equal to 
zero, and the number of positive earnings surprises are not equal, the number of observations in each quantile must differ.  The magnitudes are statistically different at the 1% level for 
quantiles 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, and 9.    37
Panel A: Distribution of Earnings Announcements by Day of the Week
All Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday
Number 121381 17032 31022 30919 35421 6987
Fraction 1.0000 0.1403 0.2556 0.2547 0.2918 0.0576
Table 1. Summary Statistics
 
 
Panel B: Differences Between Announcements on Friday and Other Weekdays
All Friday Non-Friday Difference Friday Non-Friday Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Earnings surprise -0.0013 -0.0043 -0.0011 -0.0033 -0.0048 -0.0017 -0.0031
(0.0254) (0.0382) (0.0244) (0.0005)*** (0.0404) (0.0261) (0.0006)***
Market Cap ($M) 3248 2440 3297 -857 2397 2467 -70
(14800) (12600) (14900) (157)*** (13200) (15300) (215)
Year 1999.0460 1998.5600 1999.0760 -0.5160 1998.5680 1998.7970 -0.2290
(2.6408) (2.6328) (2.6384) (.0324)*** (2.6137) (2.6283) (.0410)***
Month 1 in Quarter 0.6233 0.5801 0.6259 -0.0458 0.5898 0.6002 -0.0104
(0.4846) (0.4936) (0.4839) (.0061)*** (0.4919) (0.4899) (0.0077)
Month 2 in Quarter 0.2949 0.3152 0.2936 0.0215 0.3138 0.3089 0.0049
(0.4560) (0.4646) (0.4554) (.0057)*** (0.4641) (0.4620) (0.0072)
Month 3 in Quarter 0.0819 0.1048 0.0805 0.0243 0.0965 0.0910 0.0055
(0.2742) (0.3063) (0.2720) (.0037)*** (0.2953) (0.2876) (0.0046)
Large Shareholder 0.6822 0.6555 0.6836 -0.0281 0.6569 0.6646 -0.0077
(0.4656) (0.4753) (0.4651) (.0089)*** (0.4749) (0.4721) (0.0117)
Entrenchment Index 9.0925 9.1338 9.0903 0.0435 8.9943 9.0867 -0.0924
(2.7462) (2.7479) (2.7461) (0.0565) (2.7801) (2.8188) (0.0748)
N N = 121381 N = 6987 N = 114394 N = 121381 N = 5192 N = 18630 N = 23822
Baseline Sample Homogeneous Sample
Notes: In Columns 1-3 and 5-6 we present summary statistics, with standard deviations in parentheses. In Column 4 we present the difference between Columns 2 and 3, with
standard errors for the difference. In Column 7 we present the difference between Columns 5 and 6, with standard errors for the difference. The homogeneous sample refers to
announcements by companies that announced earnings both on Friday and other weekdays at least ten percent of the time. The indicator for a large shareholder is available for
only 57,924 observations. The entrenchment index is available for only 48,500 observations. Publicly traded stocks in CRSP are matched to earnings announcements recorded
in Compustat and I/B/E/S from the beginning of 1995 until June 2004. The earnings surprise for a quarterly announcement is the difference between actual earnings for the
quarter recorded by I/B/E/S and the median analyst forecast included in the I/B/E/S detail file during the 30 days before the quarterly earnings announcement scaled by the stock
price 5 trading days before the announcement. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  38
Panel A: The Dependent Variable is the Cumulative Abnormal Return in Event Time From 0 to 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant -0.0365 -0.0384 -0.0332 -0.0328 -0.0238 -0.0302
(0.0015)*** (0.0016)*** (0.0031)*** (0.0010)*** (0.0025)*** (0.0019)***
Friday 0.0053 0.0035 0.0030 0.0035 0.0018 0.0031
(0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0055) (0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0036)
Top Quantile 0.0659 0.0682 0.0595
(0.0016)*** (0.0017)*** (0.0036)***
(Top Quantile)*Friday -0.0123 -0.0095 -0.0055
(0.0054)** (0.0055)* (0.0067)
Top Two Quantiles 0.0578 0.0590 0.0511
(0.0011)*** (0.0011)*** (0.0023)***
(Top Two Quantiles)*Friday -0.0109 -0.0087 -0.0062
(0.0035)*** (0.0035)** (0.0043)
Controls XX XX
Controls Interacted with Top (Two) XX XX
Homogenenous Sample XX
R
2 0.0797 0.0882 0.0910 0.0763 0.0820 0.0824
N N = 20880 N = 20880 N = 5057 N = 41582 N = 41582 N = 9636
Panel B: The Dependent Variable is the Cumulative Abnormal Return in Event Time From 2 to 75
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant -0.0099 -0.0068 -0.0227 -0.0056 0.0073 -0.0156
(0.0074) (0.0066) (0.0108)** (0.0052) (0.0048) (0.0071)**
Friday -0.0411 -0.0293 -0.0301 -0.0279 -0.0221 -0.0185
(0.0179)** (0.0163)* (0.0197) (0.0118)** (0.0110)** (0.0133)
Top Quantile 0.0550 0.0523 0.0423
(0.0072)*** (0.0069)*** (0.0130)***
(Top Quantile)*Friday 0.0380 0.0327 0.0527
(0.0185)** (0.0179)* (0.0220)**
Top Two Quantiles 0.0455 0.0437 0.0394
(0.0045)*** (0.0043)*** (0.0083)***
(Top Two Quantiles)*Friday 0.0261 0.0231 0.0307
(0.0127)** (0.0127)* (0.0156)**
Controls XX XX
Controls Interacted with Top (Two) XX XX
Homogenenous Sample XX
R
2 0.0047 0.0505 0.0540 0.0038 0.0394 0.0393
N N = 20880 N = 20880 N = 5057 N = 41582 N = 41582 N = 9636
Table 2. Differential Response for the Top and Bottom Quantiles
Notes: Publicly traded stocks in CRSP are matched to earnings announcements recorded in Compustat and I/B/E/S from the beginning of 1995 until June 2004. In event time, day 0 is the day
of the earnings announcement. The cumulative abnormal return for each stock is the raw buy-and-hold return adjusted using the estimated beta from the market model. The earnings surprise
for a particular quarterly announcement is the difference between actual earnings for the quarter recorded by I/B/E/S and the median analyst forecast included in the I/B/E/S detail file during the
30 days before the quarterly earnings announcement scaled by the stock price 5 trading days before the announcement. Quantiles 1 through 5 contain earnings announcements for five quintiles
of negative earnings surprises and quantiles 7 through 11 contain earnings surprises for 5 quintiles of positive earnings surprises. Quantile number 6 contains all announcements with an
earnings surprise equal to zero. Since the number of negative earnings surprises, the number of surprises equal to zero, and the number of positive earnings surprises are not equal, the number
of observations in each quantile differ.
Columns 1, 2, and 3 only include observations from the top quantile (11) and the bottom quantile (1). Columns 4, 5, and 6 only include observations from the top two quantiles (10 and 11) or the
bottom two quantiles (1 and 2). The homogeneous sample refers to announcements by companies that announced earnings both on Friday and other weekdays at least ten percent of the time.
The set of controls includes indicators for the year of announcement, the month of announcement, and the decile of a firm's market capitalization. Standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity
and clustered by day of announcement are in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%    39
Panel C: The Dependent Variable is the Cumulative Abnormal Return in Event Time From 0 to 75
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant -0.0458 -0.0445 -0.0580 -0.0382 -0.0262 -0.0471
(0.0074)*** (0.0065)*** (0.0105)*** (0.0052)*** (0.0049)*** (0.0071)***
Friday -0.0360 -0.0255 -0.0239 -0.0247 -0.0202 -0.0131
(0.0180)** (0.0163) (0.0199) (0.0120)** (0.0111)* (0.0137)
Top Quantile 0.1256 0.1233 0.1048
(0.0074)*** (0.0072)*** (0.0132)***
(Top Quantile)*Friday 0.0224 0.0201 0.0437
(0.0190) (0.0185) (0.0229)*
Top Two Quantiles 0.1071 0.1058 0.0940
(0.0047)*** (0.0045)*** (0.0086)***
(Top Two Quantiles)*Friday 0.0139 0.0129 0.0222
(0.0132) (0.0132) (0.0163)
Controls X X XX
Controls Interacted with Top (Two) X X XX
Homogenenous Sample XX
R
2 0.0185 0.0628 0.0663 0.0168 0.0510 0.0510
N N = 20880 N = 20880 N = 5057 N = 41582 N = 41582 N = 9636
Panel D: Ratio of the Delayed Stock Response (2 to 75) to the Long-term Stock Response (0 to 75)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.6287 0.5866 0.6361 0.5922 0.5597 0.6046
(0.0497) (0.0548) (0.0522) (0.0441) (0.0484) (0.0480)
0.4380 0.4188 0.4003 0.4252 0.4109 0.4205
(0.0335) (0.0334) (0.0774) (0.0251) (0.0244) (0.0540)
0.1907 0.1678 0.2357 0.1670 0.1489 0.1841
(0.0599)*** (0.0627)*** (0.0913)*** (0.0507)*** (0.0536)*** (0.0723)**
Controls XX XX
Controls Interacted with Top (Two) XX XX
Homogenenous Sample XX
N N = 20880 N = 20880 N = 5057 N = 41582 N = 41582 N = 9636
Table 2 (Continued). Differential Response for the Top and Bottom Quantiles
Notes: Publicly traded stocks in CRSP are matched to earnings announcements recorded in Compustat and I/B/E/S from the beginning of 1995 until June 2004. In event time, day 0 is the
day of the earnings announcement. The cumulative abnormal return for each stock is the raw buy-and-hold return adjusted using the estimated beta from the market model. The earnings
surprise for a particular quarterly announcement is the difference between actual earnings for the quarter recorded by I/B/E/S and the median analyst forecast included in the I/B/E/S detail
file during the 30 days before the quarterly earnings announcement scaled by the stock price 5 trading days before the announcement. Quantiles 1 through 5 contain earnings
announcements for five quintiles of negative earnings surprises and quantiles 7 through 11 contain earnings surprises for 5 quintiles of positive earnings surprises. Quantile number 6
contains all announcements with an earnings surprise equal to zero. Since the number of negative earnings surprises, the number of surprises equal to zero, and the number of positive
earnings surprises are not equal, the number of observations in each quantile differ.
Columns 1, 2, and 3 only include observations from the top quantile (11) and the bottom quantile (1). Columns 4, 5, and 6 only include observations from the top two quantiles (10 and 11)
or the bottom two quantiles (1 and 2). The Response Ratios in Panel D are computed as the ratio of the Top-to-Bottom Return (2 to 75) from Table 2B and the Top-to-Bottom Return (0 to
75) from Table 2C. The homogeneous sample refers to announcements by companies that announced earnings both on Friday and other weekdays at least ten percent of the time. The set
of controls includes indicators for the year of announcement, the month of announcement, and the decile of a firm's market capitalization. Standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity
and clustered by day of announcement are in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Difference between the response 
ratio for Friday and other days
Response ratio for announcements 
on other days
Response ratio for Friday 
announcements  40
Dependent Variable: Cumulative Abnormal Return in Event Time from 0 to 1 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Constant -0.0060 -0.0040 -0.0040 -0.0017 -0.0031 -0.0038 -0.0028
(0.0007)*** (0.0006)*** (0.0006)*** (0.0007)** (0.0012)** (0.0006)*** (0.0011)**
Earnings Surprise Quantile 1 -0.0306 -0.0223 -0.0220 -0.0270 -0.0181 -0.0235
(0.0015)*** (0.0019)*** (0.0020)*** (0.0045)*** (0.0018)*** (0.0043)***
Earnings Surprise Quantile 2 -0.0234 -0.0158 -0.0155 -0.0237 -0.0118 -0.0148
(0.0013)*** (0.0015)*** (0.0015)*** (0.0040)*** (0.0013)*** (0.0031)***
Earnings Surprise Quantile 3 -0.0149 -0.0099 -0.0098 -0.0123 -0.0088 -0.0081
(0.0011)*** (0.0011)*** (0.0011)*** (0.0027)*** (0.0011)*** (0.0023)***
Earnings Surprise Quantile 4 -0.0105 -0.0066 -0.0066 -0.0065 -0.0051 -0.0050
(0.0011)*** (0.0009)*** (0.0009)*** (0.0021)*** (0.0008)*** (0.0020)***
Earnings Surprise Quantile 5 -0.0075 -0.0048 -0.0047 -0.0048 -0.0044 -0.0053
(0.0010)*** (0.0008)*** (0.0008)*** (0.0020)** (0.0008)*** (0.0020)***
Earnings Surprise Quantile 7 0.0067 0.0043 0.0043 0.0032 0.0040 0.0022
(0.0009)*** (0.0007)*** (0.0007)*** (0.0017)* (0.0006)*** (0.0015)
Earnings Surprise Quantile 8 0.0157 0.0101 0.0100 0.0100 0.0091 0.0084
(0.0009)*** (0.0010)*** (0.0010)*** (0.0022)*** (0.0010)*** (0.0020)***
Earnings Surprise Quantile 9 0.0215 0.0137 0.0135 0.0143 0.0128 0.0121
(0.0009)*** (0.0013)*** (0.0013)*** (0.0027)*** (0.0013)*** (0.0026)***
Earnings Surprise Quantile 10 0.0264 0.0169 0.0166 0.0148 0.0155 0.0142
(0.0009)*** (0.0015)*** (0.0016)*** (0.0028)*** (0.0016)*** (0.0029)***
Earnings Surprise Quantile 11 0.0354 0.0229 0.0225 0.0262 0.0203 0.0196
(0.0011)*** (0.0020)*** (0.0021)*** (0.0044)*** (0.0020)*** (0.0037)***
Arctan Coefficient: φ1  714.4450
(40.4694)***
Arctan Coefficient: φ2  0.0135
(0.0011)***
Arctan Coefficient: φpos  0.2224
(0.0688)***
Friday -0.1874 -0.1633 -0.1477 -0.1552 -0.1252 -0.2094 -0.1774












2 0.0514 0.0530 0.0530 0.0548 0.0528 0.0487 0.0510
N N = 121381 N = 121381 N = 121381 N = 121381 N = 23822 N = 114894 N = 21453
Notes: Publicly traded stocks in CRSP are matched to earnings announcements recorded in Compustat and I/B/E/S from the beginning of 1995 until June 2004. In event time, day 0 is the day of
the earnings announcement. The cumulative abnormal return for each stock is the raw buy-and-hold return adjusted using the estimated beta from market model. The earnings surprise for a
particular quarterly announcement is the difference between actual earnings for the quarter recorded by I/B/E/S and the median analyst forecast included in the I/B/E/S detail file during the 30
days before the quarterly earnings announcement scaled by the stock price 5 trading days before the announcement. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 3. Short-term Stock Price Response to an Earnings Announcement
The homogeneous sample refers to announcements by companies that announced earnings both on Friday and other weekdays at least ten percent of the time. The controls enter the non-linear
regression in a proportional fashion. The set of controls includes indicators for the year of announcement, the month of announcement, and the decile of a firm's market capitalization.
Announcements made on Saturday or Sunday are excluded from the sample. Standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by day of announcement are in parentheses.  41
Dependent Variable: Abnormal Volume in Event Time from 0 to 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Constant 0.4393 0.6695 0.4295 0.4332 0.5707 0.3869 0.3285
(0.0085)*** (0.0241)*** (0.0289)*** (0.0299)*** (0.0221)*** (0.0274)*** (0.0528)***
Earnings Surprise Quantile 1 0.1382 0.0793 0.1835 0.1839 0.2130 0.1850 0.2114
(0.0143)*** (0.0145)*** (0.0161)*** (0.0161)*** (0.0328)*** (0.0161)*** (0.0327)***
Earnings Surprise Quantile 2 0.0964 0.0619 0.1689 0.1693 0.2131 0.1699 0.2125
(0.0133)*** (0.0131)*** (0.0137)*** (0.0138)*** (0.0305)*** (0.0137)*** (0.0304)***
Earnings Surprise Quantile 3 0.0556 0.0345 0.1343 0.1345 0.1519 0.1353 0.1509
(0.0132)*** (0.0131)*** (0.0136)*** (0.0136)*** (0.0296)*** (0.0135)*** (0.0295)***
Earnings Surprise Quantile 4 0.0345 0.0257 0.1040 0.1041 0.0414 0.1066 0.0425
(0.0120)*** (0.0118)** (0.0121)*** (0.0121)*** (0.0283) (0.0121)*** (0.0282)
Earnings Surprise Quantile 5 0.0073 0.0134 0.0675 0.0676 0.0423 0.0702 0.0466
(0.0117) (0.0115) (0.0117)*** (0.0117)*** (0.0293) (0.0117)*** (0.0293)
Earnings Surprise Quantile 7 0.0215 0.0445 -0.0077 -0.0078 -0.0101 -0.0045 -0.0061
(0.0091)** (0.0087)*** (0.0085) (0.0086) (0.0243) (0.0085) (0.0244)
Earnings Surprise Quantile 8 0.0492 0.0608 0.0245 0.0248 0.0140 0.0263 0.0153
(0.0094)*** (0.0091)*** (0.0094)*** (0.0094)*** (0.0254) (0.0093)*** (0.0255)
Earnings Surprise Quantile 9 0.0842 0.0889 0.0939 0.0938 0.0694 0.0945 0.0696
(0.0093)*** (0.0091)*** (0.0093)*** (0.0093)*** (0.0245)*** (0.0093)*** (0.0244)***
Earnings Surprise Quantile 10 0.1353 0.1318 0.1745 0.1744 0.1668 0.1755 0.1683
(0.0100)*** (0.0098)*** (0.0103)*** (0.0103)*** (0.0255)*** (0.0103)*** (0.0254)***
Earnings Surprise Quantile 11 0.2248 0.2027 0.3060 0.3061 0.3133 0.3064 0.3122
(0.0106)*** (0.0103)*** (0.0111)*** (0.0111)*** (0.0261)*** (0.0110)*** (0.0260)***
Friday -0.1052 -0.1243 -0.0480 -0.0521 -0.0669 -0.0214 -0.0432







Aggregate Abnormal Volume 0.3956 0.3457
(0.0319)*** (0.0412)***
Controls XXXXXX
Company Fixed Effects XXXXX
Homogeneous Sample XX
R
2 0.0072 0.0297 0.1897 0.1901 0.1956 0.1958 0.1996
N N = 121179N = 121179N = 121179N = 121179 N = 23735 N = 121179 N = 23735
Table 4. Short-term Volume Response to an Earnings Announcement
Notes: Publicly traded stocks in CRSP are matched to earnings announcements recorded in Compustat and I/B/E/S from the beginning of 1995 until June 2004. In event time,
day 0 is the day of the earnings announcement. The abnormal volume for each stock is the average log volume on the day of and the day after the announcement, divided by
the average log volume for the period -20 to -11 in event time (10 trading days). The earnings surprise for a particular quarterly announcement is the difference between actual
earnings for the quarter recorded by I/B/E/S and the median analyst forecast included in the I/B/E/S detail file during the 30 days before the quarterly earnings announcement
scaled by the stock price 5 trading days before the announcement.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
The homogeneous sample refers to announcements by companies that announced earnings both on Friday and other weekdays at least ten percent of the time.T h es e to f
controls includes indicators for the year of announcement, the month of announcement, and the decile of a firm's market capitalization. Announcements made on Saturday or
Sunday are excluded from the sample. Standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by day of announcement are in parentheses.           
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Panel A: The Dependent Variable is an Indicator for Negative Earnings
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )
Friday 1.3275 1.2504 1.7597 1.8122 1.6178








Company Fixed Effects XXX
Homogeneous Friday Sample X
Specification Logit Logit Cond. Logit Cond. Logit Cond. Logit
Baseline of Dep. Var. 0.1949 0.1949 0.2862 0.2862 0.2981
N N = 121381 N = 121381 N = 60037 N = 60037 N = 11779
Panel B: The Dependent Variable is an Indicator for Negative Earnings Surprise
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )
Friday 1.7548 1.6007 1.3646 1.3812 1.3661








Company Fixed Effects XXX
Homogeneous Sample X
Specification Logit Logit Cond. Logit Cond. Logit Cond. Logit
Baseline of Dep. Var. 0.2824 0.2824 0.2919 0.2919 0.3555
N N = 121381 N = 121381 N = 113424 N = 113424 N = 22771
Table 5. Firm Timing of Earnings Announcements (Odds Ratios)
Notes: Estimates from logit and conditional logit regressions are reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. The standard errors are clustered by day of
announcement for the logit specifications, but not for the conditional logit. Publicly traded stocks in CRSP are matched to earnings announcements recorded in Compustat
and I/B/E/S from the beginning of 1995 until June 2004. In event time, day 0 is the day of the earnings announcement. Measures of actual and forecasted earnings per
share are extracted from I/B/E/S. The earnings surprise for a particular quarterly announcement is the difference between actual earnings per share for the quarter and the
median analyst forecast included in the I/B/E/S detail file during the 30 days before the quarterly earnings announcement scaled by the stock price 5 trading days before
the announcement. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
The homogeneous sample refers to announcements by companies that announced earnings both on Friday and other weekdays at least ten percent of the time.T h es e t
of controls includes indicators for the year of announcement, the month of announcement, and the decile of a firm's market capitalization. Announcements made on
Saturday or Sunday are excluded from the sample.The conditional logit specifications have fewer observations because any company for which the dependent variable
does not vary over time is automatically dropped from the sample.
   43
Panel C: The Dependent Variable is the Abnormal Stock Return from 0 to 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 0.0013 0.0024 0.0310 0.0321 0.0285
(0.0004)*** (0.0016) (0.0025)*** (0.0027)*** (0.0042)***
Friday -0.0051 -0.0049 -0.0050 -0.0062 -0.0041








Company Fixed Effects XXX
Homogeneous Sample X
R
2 0.0002 0.0022 0.1020 0.1022 0.1155
N N = 121381 N = 121381 N = 121381 N = 121381 N = 23822
Table 5 (Continued). Firm Timing of Earnings Announcements
Notes: Estimates from OLS regressions with robust standard errors are reported in each column. Standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by day of
announcement. Publicly traded stocks in CRSP are matched to earnings announcements recorded in Compustat and I/B/E/S from the beginning of 1995 until June 2004.
In event time, day 0 is the day of the earnings announcement. The cumulative abnormal return for each stock is the raw buy-and-hold return adjusted using the estimated
beta from market model. The homogeneous sample refers to announcements by companies that announced earnings both on Friday and other weekdays at leastt e n
percent of the time. The set of controls includes indicators for the year of announcement, the month of announcement, and the decile of a firm's market capitalization. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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Number of Trading Days After 
Imputed Date for the Actual 
Announcement -2 -1 0 1 2 Other Total
Panel A: Years 1984 to 1988
0 3 85 91 8 0 31 1 8
0.0% 32.2% 50.0% 15.3% 0.0% 2.5% 100.0%
1 74 280 53 8 11 427
0.2% 17.3% 65.6% 12.4% 1.9% 2.6% 100.0%
Panel B: Years 1989 to 1994
0 15 232 139 6 0 392
0.0% 3.8% 59.2% 35.5% 1.5% 0.0% 100.0%
2 21 391 27 2 21 446
0.4% 4.7% 87.7% 6.1% 0.4% 4.7% 100.0%
Panel C: Years 1995 to 2004
0 16 632 11 0 1 660
0.0% 2.4% 95.8% 1.7% 0.0% 0.2% 100.0%
1 13 546 5 0 6 571
0.2% 2.3% 95.6% 0.9% 0.0% 1.1% 100.0%
Appendix Table 1. Accuracy of the Imputed Date for Earnings Announcements
Notes: Newswire searches using Lexis-Nexis provide the actual date for the earnings announcement. The imputed date for the earnings announcement is generated from the recorded announcement dates in
Compustat and I/B/E/S using a simple algorithm. The algorithm is described in the text and is designed to maximize the match between imputed and actual dates in the sample of 2614 observations randomly
selected for a newswire search. 
Number of Imputed Friday 
Announcements
Number of Imputed Non-Friday 
Announcements
Number of Imputed Friday 
Announcements
Number of Imputed Non-Friday 
Announcements
Number of Imputed Friday 
Announcements
Number of Imputed Non-Friday 
Announcements









Panel A: Mean Cumulative Abnormal Return by Earning Surprise Quantile in Event Time From 0 to 1
Friday -0.0315 -0.0274 -0.0186 -0.0153 -0.0103 -0.0036 0.0023 0.0035 0.0126 0.0122 0.0224
(0.0044) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0023) (0.0029)
Other Days -0.0366 -0.0291 -0.0208 -0.0165 -0.0136 -0.0061 0.0006 0.0099 0.0155 0.0206 0.0294
(0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0009)
Panel B: Mean Cumulative Abnormal Return by Earning Surprise Quantile in Event Time From 2 to 75
Friday -0.0517 -0.0144 0.0118 0.0103 0.0089 -0.0151 0.0052 0.0348 0.0247 0.0341 0.0420
(0.0143) (0.0120) (0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0098) (0.0082) (0.0100) (0.0093) (0.0104) (0.0123)
Other Days -0.0098 -0.0014 -0.0023 -0.0072 -0.0060 0.0003 0.0042 0.0104 0.0215 0.0346 0.0452
(0.0057) (0.0044) (0.0039) (0.0034) (0.0030) (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0027) (0.0036)
Panel C: Mean Cumulative Abnormal Return by Earning Surprise Quantile in Event Time From 0 to 75
Friday -0.0827 -0.0423 -0.0057 -0.0057 0.0007 -0.0163 0.0081 0.0390 0.0384 0.0493 0.0661
(0.0145) (0.0121) (0.0122) (0.0112) (0.0120) (0.0111) (0.0087) (0.0102) (0.0098) (0.0110) (0.0130)
Other Days -0.0459 -0.0307 -0.0236 -0.0236 -0.0192 -0.0052 0.0058 0.0214 0.0388 0.0579 0.0798
(0.0057) (0.0044) (0.0040) (0.0034) (0.0031) (0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0025) (0.0027) (0.0029) (0.0039)
Panel D: Mean Cumulative Abnormal Return by Earning Surprise Quantile in Event Time From -30 to -1
Friday -0.0732 -0.0229 -0.0217 0.0016 -0.0014 -0.0142 0.0148 0.0205 0.0131 0.0169 0.0141
(0.0094) (0.0065) (0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0075) (0.0052) (0.0058) (0.0056) (0.0059) (0.0061) (0.0071)
Other Days -0.0701 -0.0356 -0.0129 -0.0134 0.0000 -0.0059 0.0261 0.0222 0.0252 0.0248 0.0225
(0.0031) (0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0022)
Panel E: Mean Surprise by Earning Surprise Quantile
Friday -0.056606 -0.006895 -0.002661 -0.001137 -0.000387 0.000000 0.000316 0.000735 0.001365 0.002827 0.015698
718 654 518 509 395 894 521 602 579 743 854
Other Days -0.049801 -0.006934 -0.002678 -0.001112 -0.000379 0.000000 0.000306 0.000714 0.001377 0.002826 0.014828
6308 6290 6297 6299 6289 17830 13022 13020 13014 13015 13010
Appendix Table 2. Characteristics of Stocks Classified by Earnings Surprise Quantile and Day of Week
Notes: Publicly traded stocks in CRSP are matched to earnings announcements recorded in Compustat and I/B/E/S from the beginning of 1995 until June 2004. In event time, day 0 is the day of the earnings announcement. The
cumulative abnormal return for each stock is the raw buy-and-hold return adjusted using the estimated beta from market model. The earnings surprise for a particular quarterly announcement is the difference between actual earnings
for the quarter recorded by I/B/E/S and the median analyst forecast included in the I/B/E/S detail file during the 30 days before the quarterly earnings announcement scaled by the stock price 5 trading days before the announcement.
Quantiles 1 through 5 contain earnings announcements for five quintiles of negative earnings surprises and quantiles 7 through 11 contain earnings surprises for 5 quintiles of positive earnings surprises. Quantile number 6 contains all
announcements with an earnings surprise equal to zero. Since the number of negative earnings surprises, the number of surprises equal to zero, and the number of positive earnings surprises are not equal, the number of observations
in each quantile must differ. Announcements that appear to be made on Saturday or Sunday are excluded from this analysis. Standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity are in parentheses.  